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THE RISE OF PRIVATE MILITIA: A FIRST AND SECOND
AMENDMENT ANALYSIS OF THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE
AND THE RIGHT TO TRAIN
JOELLE E. POLESKYt
INTRODUCTION
Copious news coverage of Ruby Ridge,' Waco,2 and the
Oklahoma City bombing' has prompted a growing concern with the
proliferation of paramilitary organizations and paramilitary
activity.4 The public's anxiety is fueled by the belief that private
militia pose a threat to society. Private militia are commonly
misunderstood and mischaracterized as organizations comprised
solely of right-wing militants adhering to Aryan, racist ideology.
Although many militia members subscribe to these views, allegiance
to the far right is not a prerequisite to membership in a private
militia.5 Instead, ardent belief in the need to protect individual
t B.S.F.S. 1992, Georgetown University; J.D. Candidate 1997, University of
Pennsylvania. This Comment could not have been created without the unwavering
support of Carl, Diane, and Jared and the specific encouragement of Brett. I am
grateful to those members of the Law Review who assisted me throughout this
arduous process, in particular Michael Baughman, Erica Dao, andJames Keller. This
Comment is in honor of my grandfather, whose perseverance in life and dedication
to his family are an enduring inspiration.
' In 1992, federal agents raided the Ruby Ridge, Idaho residence of Randy
Weaver, a white separatist. During the ensuing standoff, a United States marshal and
Weaver's wife and son were killed. See Idaho Supremacist Says He's Wounded, ST. LOUIS
PosT-DISPATCH, Aug. 30, 1992, at A10; see also Over 200 Militias and Support Groups
Operated Nationwide: Oklahoma Bombing Suspects Linked to Michigan Militia,
KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REP., June 1995, at 1, 3 [hereinafter Over 200 Militias].
2 During the 1993 siege on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco, Texas, four
federal agents were killed, and 78 Branch Davidians died in the fire that destroyed
the compound. See Over 200 Militias, supra note 1, at 3.
3 On April 19, 1995, a federal building in Oklahoma City was bombed, killing 168
people. The main suspects in the case are believed to be affiliated with a militia
group in Michigan. See id. at 2; Ellen Wulfhorst, Second Oklahoma Bomb Suspect
Arrested, Rueters World Service, Apr. 23, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File (reporting on the bombing before all the details and casualties had been
determined).
4 This Comment will alternately refer to private militia groups as paramilitary
organizations or simply militia. The words "militia" or "paramilitary organizations"
should be understood to mean privately sanctioned military groups that convene to
promote their views and to train with arms. They do not refer to any form of
government (federal or state) funded, or government organized, military entity.
5 See GlenJustice, Today's Militia Units FightingMad at U.S., PHILA. INQUIRER,Jan.
1, 1995, at BI, B4 ("'Some units are tied to white supremacy groups, and some are
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rights from encroachment by the federal government is the
predominant attribute of paramilitary organizations.6 This belief
appears to be a simple exercise of the First Amendment guarantees
of the freedom of speech and the freedom of association.
7
Moreover, a textual reading of the Second Amendment seemingly
confers upon individuals the right to organize and right to train as
a militia.8
Despite what may at first appear to be a constitutional right to
operate as a militia, numerous states have statutes prohibiting the
existence of private militia and/or their training activities. To
assess the constitutionality of these state statutes, this Comment
examines some of the First and Second Amendment issues involved
in regulating private militia.'
Part I of this Comment provides an abbreviated historical
account of the militia movement, starting with its origins in England
and its subsequent evolution in the United States. It also explores
characteristics common to today's paramilitary organizations. Part
II introduces the two types of state statutes-those that prohibit
paramilitary organization altogether and those that proscribe only
paramilitary training. Part III provides a First Amendment analysis,
elaborating on the significance of political speech and association
with respect to paramilitary organizations and discussing the
fundamental distinction between speech and conduct with respect
to paramilitary training. Part IV will conclude that states have the
not .... It's not fair to paint the [entire] movement with that kind of character.'"
(alteration in original)). However, the existence of racist sentiment among many
militia groups cannot be discounted. Approximately one-fifth of the over 200 militia
groups that exist have affiliations with neo-Nazi and white supremacist organizations.
See Over 200 Militias, supra note 1, at 1.
6 "Interviews with militia organizers reveal that there is no shared set of political
philosophies other than a dogged belief in gun owners' rights and a deep distrust of
government." Justice, supra note 5, at B4.
' The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I
(emphasis added).
8 The Second Amendment provides that "A well regulated Militia, being necessary
to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed." U.S. CONST. amend. II (emphasis added). Butsee infra part IV.C.I (noting
that the state governments have the power to regulate the possession of arms as part
of their power to regulate the militia).
' This Comment merely addresses some of the potential First Amendment issues
that could be raised to challenge these statutes. Similarly, the Second Amendment
discussion focuses on the right to bear arms only as it relates to the Militia Clause.
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constitutional authority to regulate private militia activity because
the Second Amendment, as interpreted, grants states the power to
regulate both the militia and the possession of arms as it relates to
the militia.
The creation of private militia is a politically expressive means
of exercising the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and
association, as paramilitary organization 0 constitutes a pointed
expression of anguish about alleged government infringement on
individual rights and about the manner in which these rights can be
protected.1 Statutes completely banning the creation of private
militia violate the First Amendment because the prohibition directly
attacks the message militia members aim to convey.
1 2
Paramilitary training is also intended to impart a message about
the manner in which individual rights can be protected and
government abuses allayed. Nonetheless, expressive conduct can be
constitutionally proscribed if there is some valid purpose and the
regulation is not aimed at stifling the expressive element. Thus,
anti-paramilitary training statutes should pass constitutional muster
because their purpose in regulating militia activity is unrelated to
the suppression of expression.
Judicial precedent clearly demonstrates that paramilitary
organizations cannot rely on the Second Amendment to justify
either their existence or their activity. 3 The Second Amendment
right to a "well regulated militia" does not encompass an unbridled
license for individuals to organize as a private militia independent
of the state. Rather, the state is empowered to determine what
constitutes a militia 4 and whether the possession of arms is
necessary to the maintenance of that which the state deems a
militia. 5
Although the actual creation of paramilitary organizations is not
protected by the Second Amendment, per se, militia members can
seek constitutional refuge in the First Amendment rights to freedom
of speech and association. Paramilitary training, however, can be
constitutionally proscribed under both the First and Second
Amendments. Hence, although anti-paramilitary organization
10 See infra part III.A.1-2.
11 See infra notes 42-48 and accompanying text.
12 See infra part III.A.l.c, III.A.2.c.
" See infra part IV.
N See infra part IV.B.2.
"5 See United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939); see also infra part IV.C.I.
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statutes are an unconstitutional limitation on individual rights, anti-
paramilitary training statutes survive constitutional scrutiny.
I. HISTORY OF THE MILITIA
The militia first existed to prevent the rise of tyrannical govern-
ment.1 6 Over time, however, the significance of the militia to free
society diminished considerably, primarily because of the "emerging
... belief that the interests of the people ... could be protected
effectively by the establishment of democratic governments, offering
legal guarantees of individual rights.""7
Militia members today believe that modern government has
failed to achieve or sustain this democratic ideal. 8 The funda-
mental purpose of current paramilitary organizations, therefore,
corresponds with the historical justification for maintaining a
militia-militia members consider their existence necessary to
protect society from the federal government.' 9 What was once a
viable means of supplying protection against the federal govern-
ment, however, may no longer be a realistic alternative. The militia
may have been an efficient means of protection when the country
was small and when only a select portion of society contributed to
the democratic process; but modern society simply does not foster
an environment conducive to the existence of private, armed groups
protecting the citizenry.
20
6 See Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. Henigan, The Second Amendment in the
Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 U. DAYrON L. REV. 5, 15
(1989) ("The colonists' English heritage had taught them that standing armies were
the instruments of tyranny and were acceptable only under extraordinary circum-
stances; the militia was the proper body to provide for the defense and safety of the
people in a free society.").
'" William S. Fields & David T. Hardy, The Militia and the Constitution: A Legal
Histoy, 136 MIL. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1992).
'a See infra part I.B.
19 In a militia field manual, under the section entitled "Principles Justifying the
Arming and Organizing of a Militia," it is asserted that, "[i]four leaders are corrupted
to the extent of imposing tyranny upon the people, then they should be forcefully
overthrown and replaced by a legitimate government." MILITIA FIELD MANUAL
§ 1.1.4: Principles of a just War-Capital Punishment (Free Militia 1994) [hereinafter
FIELD MANUAL].
20 See WARREN FREEDMAN, THE PRIVILEGE TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMs 20 (1989)
(arguing that "'[i]n the urban industrial society of today a general right to bear
efficient arms so as to be enabled to resist oppression by the government would mean
that gangs could exercise an extra-legal rule which could defeat the whole Bill of
Rights'" (quoting Roscoe Pound)); see also id. ("It would be inane to accept the view
that an armed citizenry of men and women using guns could take up the armed
cudgel purely for their individual political whim and political fancy. Only anarchy
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A. Roots of the Militia and an American Metamorphosis
The militia grew out of an old English custom that was adopted
by the colonies, altered to conform to the American experience, and
eventually incorporated into the Second Amendment.2 1  The
citizens' militia developed in England to serve as an effective means
of national defense and to counterbalance the strength of a
professional army.22 The English also perceived the militia as a
"critical element in their development of 'government under
law'"' 23 and as a means of tempering the strength of the monar-
chy.24 Although the view of the militia as a necessary force to
balance the strength of the army gradually changed,25 it continued
would result."); EARL R. KRUSCHKE, THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 30 (1985)
("[T]he right to bear arms is becoming anachronistic. As the policing of society
becomes more efficient, the need for arms for personal self-defense becomes more
irrelevant.... ."); Chuck Dougherty, Note, The Minutemen, the National Guard and the
Private Militia Movement: Will the Real Militia Please Stand Up?, 28 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 959, 979 (1995) (observing that "the dramatic technological changes over the
past two hundred years made the eighteenth-century militia system unfeasible").
21 See generally JOYCE L. MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (1994) (providing a
detailed history of the evolution of the citizens' militia, starting with its incep-
tion in England and concluding with its incorporation into the United States
Constitution); Fields & Hardy, supra note 17 (same); Thomas M. Moncure, Jr., Who
Is the Militia-The Virginia Rat fication Convention and the Right to Bear Arms, 19
LINCOLN L. REv. 1 (1990) (detailing the legal history of the militia and the right to
bear arms).
2 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 17, at 6 ("The experience of the Middle Ages
instilled in the English people a deep aversion to the professional army ....
Conversely, it fostered a corresponding fondness for the traditional institution of the
militia, which was perceived as an inexpensive and non-threatening means of national
defense."). Abusive treatment of civilians, as well as confiscation of arms from militia
members was often attributed to professional armies. See id. at 10.
For a list of the traits differentiating a standing army from a militia, see
Moncure, supra note 21, at 18.
' See Fields & Hardy, supra note 17, at 9. For instance,
Blackstone was firmly convinced that subjects needed to be armed to defend
themselves and to avoid dependence on professional armies, but he also
expanded the role of an armed citizenry beyond the individual's own
preservation to the preservation of the entire constitutional structure. He
dubbed the right of the people to be armed an "auxiliary" right of the
subject that served "to protect and maintain inviolate the three great and
primary rights, of personal security, personal liberty, and private property."
MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 142-43.
24 Fields & Hardy, supra note 17, at 8 (asserting that the militia was an "institution
that exercised a moderating influence on monarchical rule and aided in the
development of the Anglo-American concept of individual liberties").
' For a detailed historical discussion of the evolution of this justification for the
militia during the seventeenth century, see id. at 9-22.
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to be regarded as a politically essential method of regulating the
government. During the Enlightenment, the perception that
maintaining a citizens' militia was an individual duty was trans-
formed into a belief that militia membership constituted an
individual right.26
Colonial acceptance of a militia was compelled by the same
concern that led to its existence in England: fear of a standing
army. 7 The colonists diverged somewhat from English custom,
however, by expanding the right to bear arms to encompass both
militia members and individual citizens.2" In time, as individual
constitutions and bills of rights were formulated, a schism over this
issue developed among the colonies themselves.29 The ensuing
debate centered on whether to provide solely for a citizens' militia
or whether to also provide for an individual right to bear arms.
3 0
6 See Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Fifth Auxiliary Right, 104
YALE LJ. 995, 1006-16 (1995) (reviewingjoyce L. Malcolm's book, To Keep and Bear
Arms, supra note 21, and recounting the evolution of the militia from a general duty
to an individual right); Fields & Hardy, supra note 17, at 22 (noting that "the common
law would recognize an individual right to keep and bear arms that was separate and
distinct from the related concept that a militia was an especially appropriate way of
defending a free republic").
217 "Americans' belief in the virtues of the militia for military defence and their
distrust of standing armies mirrored English opinion. Any attempt to impose a
professional army upon the colonies was bound to be seen as the preface to tyranny."
MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 143.
"Provisions relating to standing armies also were included in the declarations or
constitutions adopted by a number of the colonies. The provisions found in about
half of those documents reflected the view that the standing army problem was a
political issue resulting from a lack of legislative control." Fields & Hardy, supra note
17, at 26; see also KRUSCHKE, supra note 20, at 17 ("The state constitutions framed
during the War for Independence reflected the fears of a standing army.... The
framers felt that such an army would create an overbearing force at the disposal of
the state governments." (quotingJOHN LEVIN, The Right to BearArms: The Development
of the American Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 148 (1971))).
28 See MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 139 ("The dangers all the colonies faced ...
were so great that not only militia members but all householders were ordered to be
armed.").
' This divergence of views has permeated the modern debate regarding the right
to bear arms. See, e.g., KRUSCHKE, supra note 20, at 13-45 (discussing both the
individualist and the collectivist interpretations of the right to bear arms); see also
infra part IV.C.
'o See Fields & Hardy, supra note 17, at 28 (elaborating on the difference between
the two ideals, stating that "[c]onstitutions that maintained the Classical Republican
link between land ownership and electoral participation also stressed the ideal of a
citizen militia ... [while] constitutions that accepted the Enlightenment concept of
near-universal manhood suffrage largely ignored the militia ideal and instead stressed
an individual right to arms"); see also MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 146-47 (noting that
the separate constitutions "were careful to indicate their preference for a militia over
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Shortly after American independence, the need for a militia
was reevaluated. The institution of the new constitutional sys-
tem of checks and balances, and the provisions for individual
rights, prompted Americans to question if a militia was a necessary
restraint on a potentially tyrannical government.3' The signifi-
cance of the militia waned, and its function changed considerably.
In 1792, the first congressional legislation regarding the militia
was passed, which emphasized the structured nature that the militia
was to assume.3 2  The next two centuries witnessed a drastic
transformation of the militia's role and general characteristics. 3
Today, the National Guard and similar highly structured and
managed military organizations are commonly considered the
"militia." 4
Modern paramilitary organizations seek to reinvigorate the
historical role and function of the militia. In addition to the legal
obstacles they may face, their endeavor is complicated by two
factors that physically inhibit the reinstitution of a traditional
a standingarmy and either specifically stated that the people had a right to be armed,
or made it necessary by insisting upon a citizen militia that was a general, not a select,
militia").
3' See FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 21 ("[T]he framers of the Constitution had
no need to create a 'right to revolution' against the excesses of any and all
government nor a license to band together in paramilitary organizations; the checks
and balances system within the Constitution itself precluded excesses of any and all
government.").
12 "The First Militia Act of 1792 defined the militia as a formal military force ....
Theformal nature of'militia' was substantiated almost 200 years later in United States
v. Oakes...." FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 22 (footnote omitted). For an assertion
that the organized nature of the militia was not statutorily prescribed until the 1903
Dick Act, see Garry Wills, To Keep and BearArms, N.Y. REV., Sept. 21, 1995, at 62, 71.
"s See Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 16, at 34-40 (providing a history of the
militia in the United States since 1789). After the United States gained indepen-
dence,
state militias first faded out of existence and then later reemerged as more
organized, semi-professional military units. The state provided the arms and
the equipment of the militia members, and these were stored centrally in
armories. With the passage of the Dick Act in 1903, the state militias were
organized into the national guard structure, which remains in place today.
United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Ehrman & Henigan,
supra, note 16).
' See Dougherty, supra note 20, at 975 (stating that "the Federal Courts of
Appeals have narrowed the Supreme Court's definition of militia to include only the
National Guard" and referring to three seminal cases to illustrate this development).
But see Moncure, supra note 21, at 24 (asserting that "[t]he National Guard of the
United Staies is not the militia consisting of the whole people, but a select militia
which is exclusive of the people").
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militia: (1) the sheer expanse of the United States, and (2) the
diverse and disorganized nature of today's militia movement.
B. An Inside Look at Today's Militia
The thrust of the new grassroots movement for a state militia
has its roots in the original thirteen colonies and their need to ban
together for the common protection of God-given natural Rights.
The government then, was becoming too oppressive and tyranni-
cal. The tolerance level was breached. Could we be witnessing
history repeating itself? 5
Members of private militia groups come from various sectors of
society 6 and are spread throughout the United States. Over half
the states are believed to have active militia groups and estimates of
membership numbers range anywhere from 1000 to 12,000 support-
ers. 7 Paramilitary organizations engage in a vast spectrum of
" Frank Isbell, The Rebirth of the State Militia, JUBILEE NEWS REVIEWS, Mar./Apr.
1994, at 7, 7.
1 See Mack Tanner, Extreme Prejudice: How the Media Misrepresent the Militia
Movement, REASON, July 1995, at 42, 45 (reporting that he "met computer pro-
grammers, owners of small businesses, professionals, writers and artists, salaried
employees, and lots of retired military officers, all well established in America's
middle class" while researching the militia movement); see also ChristopherJ. Farley,
Patriot Games, TIME, Dec. 19, 1994, at 48, 48.
In dozens of states, loosely organized paramilitary groups composed
primarily of white men are signing up new members, stockpiling weapons
and preparing for the worst. The groups, all privately run, tend to classify
themselves as "citizen militias." They are the armed, militarized edge of a
broader group of disgruntled citizenry .... The members.., are usually
family men and women who feel strangled by the economy, abandoned by
the government and have a distrust for those in power that goes well
beyond that of the typical angry voter.
Id.
'7 Klanwatch, a project of the Southern Poverty Law Center in Montgomery,
Alabama, publishes a bimonthly report entitled Klanwatch Intelligence R port
[hereinafter Klanwatch], which chronicles the findings of the Klanwatch's MilitiaTask
Force. Several of the Klanwatch publications contain a comprehensive analysis and
study of various militia activity throughout the United States. The June 1995 issue
reports that "[a]t least 224 militias and their support groups ... are active in 39
states." Over 200 Militias, supra note 1, at 1 (explaining the scope and character of
militia organizations); see also Dan Billin, Citizen Militia Followers Invade the
Mainstream, LEBANON VALLEY NEWS, Aug. 31, 1994, at Al, A5 ("Chip Berlet, who
monitors right-wing movements for a Cambridge, Mass., think-tank called Political
Research Associates, estimates there are 1000 core militia members and an additional
10,000 supporters nationwide. The movement is rather anarchic, with no formal
structure, and is active in at least 25 states .... "); Ben Macintyre, Rambo Gets Religion,
THE TIMES (London), Dec. 10, 1994, (Magazine), at 18, 20 (reporting that the
Michigan Militia claims a membership of 12,000 and discussing how the militia
RISE OF PRIVATE MILITIA
activities and maintain a variety of structures. Although paramili-
tary tactics are the focus of most private militia, 8 militia members
also engage in other forms of government protest and participate
in community programs.8 9 With respect to militia structure and
operation, some groups prefer a clandestine approach to their
activities, while others are more vocal.4" Possibly the only element
common to the operation of paramilitary organizations is their
reliance on computers as a means of communication.
4 1
movement has become a national phenomenon through the use of computer
networks, fax, shortwave radio, home-produced video, and desk-top publishing). A
recently published book estimates that there "are hundreds of groups with a
membership.., between 10,000 and 40,000... [and] their sympathizers.., number
in the hundreds of thousands." Patsy Sims, Armed and Dangerous, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 28,
1996, § 7 (Book Review), at 13, 14 (reviewing KENNETH S. STERN, A FORCE UPON THE
PLAIN: THE AMERICAN MILITIA MOVEMENT AND THE POLITICS OF HATE (1996)).
' For the purposes of this Comment, all paramilitary organizations are presumed
to engage in paramilitary training, even if they also participate in other activities.
s With respect to the variation in militia activities, it has been reported that
militias are involved in a wide variety of activities. Some members don
camouflage uniforms to practice counterinsurgency techniques in isolated
areas. Others wear warm-up suits and jeans while they plink at targets in
local rifle ranges. Still others engage in voter registration drives, or assist
local enforcement agencies in flood-relief efforts, search and rescue
operations or other -types of emergency response.
Bill Wallace, A Call to Arms, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 12, 1995, at ZI; see also Tanner, supra
note 36, at 43-44 (separating the groups of "armed citizens who have grievances
against the government" into four categories).
"' "Each militia is different in its organizational structure, leadership and rules of
operation. Some meet in private and use military-style security measures to keep
their plans secret. Others... have open public meetings, with a formal agenda and
published minutes." Wallace, supra note 39, at ZI.
Some militia members are instructed to "[t]rain only with what you need for
training.... Train only with the people you need to at the time.... Train in the
privacy of your own home.... [And i]f you need to train outside, do so in private or
remote places. Shoot where people can't see the style of weapon you are shooting."
FIELD MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.4.2: Low Profiles and Closed Mouths-Training with
Your Cell. They are also directed to make certain that "[t]raining is done within each
individual cell with a view toward fostering its ability to survive, grow and fight even
in the even [sic] it is separated from the rest of the organization." Id. § 2.4.3:
Decentralization and Transience-Decentralization Among the Cells.
41 Private militia rely predominantly on the Internet to communicate their
message.
When it comes to organization ... the troops go high tech. The militia
movement . .. "is probably the first national movement organized and
directed on the information highway." Patriot talk shows ... spread the
word that American values are under attack from within and without.
Militias also communicate via the Patriot Network, a system of linked
computer bulletin boards, and through postings in news groups on the
Internet.
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Two predominant complaints about the government provide the
rallying cry for private militia groups. First, the militia are infur-
iated by rampant "government abuse, specifically in the areas of law
enforcement and taxation."42 Belief that the government increas-
ingly subjugates individual rights-an impression fueled by the Ruby
Ridge and Waco incidents4 -compels militia to train ardently in
anticipation of a future battle with the government. This belief
leads to the militia's second fundamental complaint about the
government: It is undermining their Second Amendment rights to
bear arms and form militia.
44
Despite the aggressive antigovernment position promoted by
today's private militia, their paramount goal is not to overthrow
violently the government. Rather, they strive to protect the
citizenry from the federal government. In essence, they aim to
bring a renewed justice to the United States, 4 5 and, to date, in spite
Farley, supra note 36, at 49; see a/soJan Vertefeuille, Boy Scouts orParamilitaly Group?,
ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS, Feb. 26, 1995, at CI ("[Most militia groups] are
connected through shared propaganda and speakers. The Internet contains computer
bulletin boards full of militia discussion groups.").
42 
MONTANA HUMAN RIGHTS NETWORK, A SEASON OF DISCONTENT: MILITIAS,
CONSTITUTIONALISTS, AND THE FAR RIGHT IN MONTANA, JANUARY THROUGH MAY,
1994, at 2 (1994) [hereinafter DISCONTENT] (chronicling the expansion of far right
organizing in early 1994 and reviewing both groups and individuals who have become
active during that time).
" See Farley, supra note 36, at 49 (asserting that the militia movement "was
galvanized by two events: the bloody face-offin rural Idaho between white separatist
Randy Weaver and law-enforcement officials in 1992 and the fiery siege of the Waco,
Texas, compound of cult leader David Koresh in 1993").
" See id. "The militias believe that the Brady bill and President Clinton's crime
bill banning certain types of assault weapons.., are aimed at disarming the American
people." Vertefeuille, supra note 41, at Cl.
4- One commentator suggests the antigovernment position supported by private
militia is based on the Constitution:
From Michigan to Florida, the militias' claim is the same: the Constitution-
guaranteeing a feeble federal government and reserving most power to the
50 states-has been abandoned. In argument with echoes of our own Euro-
skepticism, militia-types fear a once proud nation is about to come under
the boot of an arrogant, remote superstate.
Jonathan Freedland, Adolf's US Army, THE GUARDIAN, Dec. 15, 1994, at T6. In
accordance with these views, therefore, private militia seek to restore the Constitu-
tion, as they understand it.
"Think of ourselves as a spider, spinning of [sic] web to catch some flies.
In this case, the flies are corrupt or abusive officials or other criminals. Our
objective is to gather and distribute evidence, protect witnesses, investiga-
tors, and other innocent persons, and bring the perpetrators to justice."
Internet Newsgroup Posting from the Constitution Society, Militia Training.
Operation WitWeb, (Mar. 24, 1995) (on file with author) [hereinafter Militia
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of "their alarmist rhetoric, most militia groups stay within the law,
advancing their ideas through the usual political process[es]."46
Militia members assert that they will defend their ideals to the
extent necessary. An examination of a sample militia oath and
Militia Declaration of Independence exhibits the earnestness of
militia members' convictions: "I - promise to defend and
observe the Constitutional liberties embodied in the Bill of Rights
for all American citizens by example, persuasion, and force of arms
if necessary. To that end, I intend to arm myself, I voluntarily join
the Free Militia, and I agree to obey its commanders .... "4 A
Militia Declaration of Independence provides that
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these
Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to
institute new Government, laying its Foundation on such Princi-
ples, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.
4
Militia members adhere to, and are motivated by, the general tenets
central to these declarations.
The response of private militia to perceived (or perhaps real)
threats imposed by the federal government further demonstrates the
interrelation of their convictions with their actions. In May 1994,
a group of militia members convened in a public park, dressed in
military fatigues, with war paint on their faces, and carrying guns.
49
The meeting's purpose was to make their presence publicly known
and to promote the message that they exist to protect against an
increasingly tyrannical federal government.5"
Training].
46 David Foster, Confrontations Spread As Gun-PackingMilitias Flourish in Montana,
Associated Press, Mar. 24, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP File (focusing
on the Montana militia, particularly Calvin Greenup, a member of the Montana
militia who refuses to pay federal income taxes); see also Tanner, supra note 36, at 45
(reporting a militia training leader as stating that "'[wie are not looking for an armed
confrontation if we can avoid it. Every week, we pick a political issue based on what
the media is reporting, and we crank out a letter on that issue which each member
sends to his congressman or senator").
47 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.4.4.
4s AMERICAN JUSTICE FED'N, DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 1994, at I (1994).
The Declaration further asserts that "as Free and Independent Sovereign Citizens,
each has the full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish
Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which an Independent Sovereign may
of right do." Id. at 3.49 See Beth Hawkins, Patriot Games, DET. METRO TIMES, Oct. 12-18, 1994, at 13
(discussing the growth of the Michigan Militia Corps and explaining the motivations,
interests, and tactics of its membership).
o See id.
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In February 1995, an Idaho National Guard helicopter flew
over the ranch of Calvin Greenup, a tax protestor. Greenup
summoned twenty others, all sporting guns and planning to
shoot down the helicopter in the event that it flew over his
land again.5 Militia activists recognized that "[w]hat some call
paranoia, Greenup calls patriotism. He's at the volatile fringe
of a burgeoning militia movement that believes an armed citizenry
is the only way to defend America from a government gone
corrupt."5"
In March 1995, the Texas militia, predicting mass arrests of
militia leaders, as well as government-staged bombings that would
be blamed on militia groups, called for
militia leaders to keep weapons nearby, but not on their persons,
to avoid providing a pretext for gunning them down. On the
other hand, it may also be a good idea if other militiamen remain
nearby, armed, with the main events in view .... If innocents...
are to be killed anyway, we need to be able to protect them
53
Although these are but a few examples of the response illicited from
militia members, they exemplify the strength of their convictions
and the motive for their organization.
The existence of private militia is often viewed as destructive
and anarchistic because they are founded on a fear and distrust of
The militia's belief that the government is out to get them also motivates them
to make themselves better known as protectors of society. For example, in response
to the allegations of government initiated actions against militia groups, it was
asserted that "[i]t is time for the militias to come out of the shadows and go public.
There is no security in obscurity. Our adversaries know who you are. You are only
hiding from other militias who may need to contact you." Internet Newsgroup
Posting fromJon Roland, Texas Militia Correspondence Committee, Militia: Rumored
March 25 Arrests (Mar. 24, 1995) (on file with author).
"' Officials maintained that the helicopter was on a training mission. See Patricia
Sullivan, Guard Chopper Stirs Up Bitterroot 'Militia', MissOULIAN, Feb. 7, 1995, at Al,
A8.
52 Internet Newsgroup Posting from Charles Zeps, ALERT! MILITIAS TARGET-
ED 24/03/95, (Mar. 24, 1995) (on file with author) (including a copy of wire report
from Darby, Montana detailing the story of Calvin Greenup).
Militia groups have also called for all militia units to convene "armed and in
uniform, to... enforce the ultimatum. The militia will arrest Congressmen who have
failed to uphold their oaths of office, who then will be tried for Treason by Citizens'
Courts." Memorandum from Linda Thompson, AmericanJustice Federation, to the
Federation Membership (Apr. 21, 1994).
's Internet Newsgroup Posting from Jon Roland, Texas Militia Correspondence
Committee, Militia: Potential Threats and Security Therefor (Mar. 3, 1995) (on file with
author).
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the federal government. Private militia are perceived as paranoid,
and many find the combination of paranoia and weapons a
dangerous prospect.54 Militia members are, indeed, motivated
by their disenchantment with the government. Nonetheless,
negative portrayal of this sentiment as a virulent loathing and
near obsession has often led to the creation of a self-ful-
filling prophesy. People perceive militia members as fringe
elements of society, and the information projected by private
militia facilitate the perpetuation of this view. This perception,
in turn, harbors continued fear and misunderstanding of militia
objectives. The secretive nature of private militia, their train-
ing activity, and the proclamations that they will go to extreme ends
to fight a tyrannical government further exacerbate the negative
public image. The threat, however, if one exists at all, is certainly
not imminent.5 Rather, it appears to be more rhetoric than
reality.
Combining the militia's ardent beliefs with an evaluation of
militia philosophies and activities can easily lead to the conclu-
sion that paramilitary organizations breed potentially explosive
elements in society.5 6 The question now arises whether states can
justify legislation in an attempt to quell the existence and activities
of these potentially persuasive, and possibly threatening, groups or
whether any such attempts will infringe on coveted constitutional
rights.
' See Macintyre, supra note 37, at 22 ("'In our view this mixture of armed groups
and those who hate is a recipe for disaster.'" (quoting Morris Dees, Director of the
Southern Poverty Law Ctr.)); Sam Stanton, On Guard, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 29,
1995, at Al ("'[W]hat we're seeing in these militia groups is that some of them are
extremely paranoid, they're extremely well-armed. Their fax messages, their
computer board messages are just aiming for a violent confrontation, which will
happen sooner or later if the paranoia stays up like this.'" (quoting Mike Reynolds of
Klanwatch)).
" See infra part III.B.2.a.
' It has been stated that:
The philosophy espoused by many of these groups is one which tells people
that society is out to get them; that the system has been taken over; and that
there is no way people can get justice through the processes currently in
place. These groups urge people to take immediate action and arm
themselves. History has demonstrated that individuals who subscribe to this
ideology are capable of acting in a violent manner.
DISCONTENT, supra note 42, at 19.
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II. ANTI-PARAMILITARY STATUTES
Two types of statutes proscribe private militia activity. The
first type prohibits paramilitary organization altogether, and
the second proscribes paramilitary training. Although anti-para-
military organization laws are an outright ban on the creation
of private militia, anti-paramilitary training statutes require proof
of intent to commit a proscribed act.5 7  Seventeen states
have currently adopted anti-paramilitary organization laws,5" seven-
teen states have anti-paramilitary training statutes,59 and seven
states have adopted both anti-organization and anti-training
statutes.
60
"' For further explanation of the differences between the statutes, see State
Lawsuits Can Shut Down Militias, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REP., June 1995, at 1
[hereinafter State Lawsuits]:
The two types of state laws operate somewhat differently. Anti-paramilitary
training laws ban groups whose members know or intend that a civil
disorder will result from their activities. Anti-militia laws, on the other
hand, ban all unauthorized militias, regardless of whether the participants
have any specific criminal intent or knowledge. Anti-militia laws generally
require a showing that a group of people associated together in a formal
military-type organization. Anti-paramilitary training statutes, by contrast,
can be used against groups as small as two or three people.
Id. at 14.
8 See ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (1989); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-123 (1991); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 29A.31 (West 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-203 (1994); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 38.440 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 342.2
(West 1989); MD. ANN. CODE art. 65, § 35 (1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 33,
§ 129 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 624.61 (West 1987); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 33-1-31 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 203.080 (Michie 1992); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 111:15 (1990); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-01-21 (1987); TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§ 431.010 (West 1988); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 38.40.120 (West 1961); W. VA.
CODE § 15-IF-7 (1995); WYO. STAT. § 19-1-106 (1977).
-9 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-71-301 to -303 (Michie 1993); CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 11460 (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-9-120 (West 1986); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53-206b(b) (West 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:117.1 (West 1986);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 7 50.528a (West 1991); MO. ANN. STAT. § 574.070(2)
(Vernon 1995); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-109 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1480 to
-1482 (1989); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-14 (West 1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-20A-1
to -20A-4 (Michie 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1321.10 (West 1983); OR. REV.
STAT. § 166.660 (1990); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5515 (1994); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-10 to -8-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-314 (1991);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-433.1 to -433.3 (Michie 1994).
60 See FLA. STAT. ANN. chs. 790.29 & 870.06 (West 1994); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 38-2-277 & 16-11-150 to -152 (1994); IDAHO CODE §§ 46-802 & 18-8101 to -8105
(1987); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 20, para. 1805/94-95 (Smith-Hurd 1995); N.Y. MIL. LAW
§ 240 (McKinney 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 127A-151 & 14-288.20 (1993); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 30-12-7 & 11-55-1 to -3 (1994). For a comprehensive list of all of the statutes,
both anti-organizational and anti-paramilitary training, see State Anti-Militia and Anti-
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A typical anti-paramilitary organization statute prohibits a group
of private individuals from convening under the guise of a military
entity without permission from the state. For example, the Alabama
anti-paramilitary organization statute states, in relevant part:
Any two or more persons, whether with or without uniform, who
associate, assemble or congregate together by or under any name
in a military capacity for the purpose of drilling, parading or
marching at any time or place or otherwise take up or bear arms
in any such capacity without authority of the governor, must, on
conviction, be fined ... 61
Similarly, the Maryland anti-paramilitary organization statute states
that
[n]o body of men other than the units of the organized militia and
the troops of the United States, except such military organizations
as are now in existence, shall associate themselves together as a
military company or organization or parade in public as a military
company or organization without the permission of the Gover-
nor.
62
Standard anti-paramilitary training statutes prohibit the use of
specific military techniques with the intent to instigate social
disorder. Michigan's anti-paramilitary training law proclaims that
Paramilitary Training Laws, KLANWATCH INTELLIGENCE REP., June 1995, at 15, 15.
For more discussion of the effectiveness of these state laws in monitoring
unlawful militia activity, see State Lawsuits, supra note 57, at 15 ("The anti-militia and
anti-paramilitary training laws give police and prosecutors potent tools to prohibit
dangerous militia activity. States can enforce the laws by investigating military-styled
groups to determine if they are 'military organizations' under the anti-militia statutes
or are engaged in 'paramilitary training' under the paramilitary laws.").
For a list of proposed alternatives to anti-paramilitary statutes as a means of
prosecuting militia members, seeJohn R. Moore, Note, Oregon's Paramilikay Activities
Statute: A Sneak Attack on the First Amendment, 20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 335, 346-48
(1984) (critiquing the ACLU's proposed use of existing criminal statutes against
conspiracy, aiding and abetting, in an attempt to prosecute paramilitary activity). See
also ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE, THE ADL ANTI-PARAMILITARY TRAINING STATUTE:
A RESPONSE TO DOMESTIC TERRORISM 1-3 (1995) (law report) (arguing that private
militia pose a threat to society and proposing the enactment of a general federal
statute prohibiting paramilitary activity); ANDREA KLAUSNER, AMERICAN JEWISH
COMM'N, MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO BAR
UNAUTHORIZED MILITARY OR PARAMILITARY ORGANIZATIONS 1 (1995) (supporting a
federal statute outlawing paramilitary organizations and asserting that "[t]he threat
of militia violence and the encouragement of lawlessness and intimidation by these
paramilitary groups underscore the pressing need for more effective regulation of
militia groups").
61 ALA. CODE § 31-2-125 (1989).
62 MD. ANN. CODE art. 65, § 35 (1988).
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it is unlawful to "teach or demonstrate to another person the use,
application, or construction of any firearm, or any explosive or
incendiary device, if that person knows, has reason to know, or
intends that what is taught or demonstrated will be used in, or in
furtherance of, a civil disorder." 3 Connecticut's anti-paramilitary
training statute, which is more comprehensive, states:
No person shall (1) teach or demonstrate to any person the use,
application or making of any firearm, explosive or incendiary
device, or technique capable of causing injury or death to a
person, knowing or intending that such firearm, explosive,
incendiary device or technique will be unlawfully employed for use
in, or in furtherance of, a civil disorder; or (2) assemble with one
or more persons for the purpose of training with, practicing with
or being instructed in the use of any firearm, explosive or
incendiary device, or technique capable of causing injury or death
to a person, intending to employ unlawfully such firearm,
explosive, incendiary device or technique for use in, or in
furtherance of, a civil disorder.
6 4
The definition of "paramilitary organization" varies by state.
However, each permutation constitutes a functional definition
incorporating elements typical of either the anti-organization or the
anti-training statutes. California defines a paramilitary organization
as:
[A]n organization which is not an agency of the United States
government or of the State ... but which engages in instruction
or training in guerilla warfare or sabotage, or which, as an
organization, engages in rioting or the violent disruption of, or the
violent interference with, school activities.
65
This definition focuses on the lack of agency ties, thereby parallel-
ing the state authorization criteria common to anti-paramilitary
organization statutes. The criteria that the group is not an agency
of the federal or state governments and that it engages in the stated
types of training are of particular import with respect to today's
paramilitary organizations because they are not endorsed by a
government and they may conduct the types of activities specifically
enumerated. Louisiana defines a paramilitary organization as:
[A] group organized in a military or paramilitary structure, consist-
ing of two or more persons who knowingly possess firearms or
63 MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 750.528a(2) (West 1991).
64 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-206b(b) (West 1994).
r CAL. PENAL CODE § 11460(a) (West 1992).
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other weapons and who train in the use of such firearms or
weapons, or knowingly teach or offer the use of such firearms or
weapons to others, for the purpose of committing an offense
66
Louisiana's definition contains the same structure and intent
requirements found in anti-paramilitary training legislation. The
criminal purpose of the activities is significant because it is not
necessarily applicable to current militia as there is not yet evidence
to substantiate the claim that they fulfill the intent requirement.
New York's anti-paramilitary statute, addressing both organiza-
tion and training, declares:
[A]ny person who assembles or conspires to assemble with one or
more persons as a paramilitary organization and has knowledge of
its purpose is guilty of a ... felony when he, with one or more
other members of such organization, practices with a military
weapon in order to further the purpose of such organization.
6 7
Under New York law, a "'paramilitary organization' means an
organization of two or more persons who engage or conspire to
engage in military instruction or training in warfare or sabotage for
the purpose of unlawfully causing physical injury to any person or
unlawfully damaging the property of any person."
68
States promulgated anti-organization and anti-training statutes
presumably because of the alleged threat to society posed by the
proliferation of private militia. The Montana state legislature, for
example, found that "conspiracies and training activities in the fur-
therance of unlawful acts of violence against persons or property are
not constitutionally protected [and] pose a threat to public order
and safety."6 9  Although the state goal of preserving the peace
would seem compelling, it may not be enough to justify both anti-
paramilitary organization and training statutes. In order to deter-
mine whether this interest can survive constitutional scrutiny, the
statutes must be examined to ascertain whether they contravene the
First and Second Amendments to the United States Constitution.70
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:117.1.C(1) (West 1986).
67 N.Y. MIL. LAW § 240(6)(a) (McKinney 1990).
- Id. § 240(6)(b).
69 MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-107 (1995).
" Before proceeding to an analysis of the constitutionality of these statutes, it is
worth noting that the Civil Obedience Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 231(a)(1) (1994), the
federal statute upon which many of these state statutes were based, see Freeman, supra
note 60, at 3, has been upheld as constitutional. See United States v. Featherston, 461
F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 991 (1976); National Mobilization
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III. THE FIRST AMENDMENT: POLITICS, ASSOCIATION,
AND CONDUCT
The First Amendment states that "Congress shall make no law
... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government
for a redress of grievances.""' Statutes proscribing paramilitary
organization and activity implicate the First Amendment because
militia members engage in expression that may merit constitutional
protection. An evaluation of these statutes necessitates drawing a
distinction between anti-organization statutes and anti-training
statutes, as these different types of statutes warrant separate First
Amendment analyses. Prevailing First Amendment jurisprudence
leads to the conclusion that, while the anti-training regulations
Comm'n v. Foran, 411 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1969).
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Foran found the Civil Obedience Act
to be a reasonable exercise of congressional power to "prevent violence to persons
and injury to their property, and when clear and present danger of riot appears, the
power of Congress to punish is obvious." Foran, 411 F.2d at 939. Further, as to the
vagueness claim raised in Foran, the court found that "[t]he requirement of intent...
'narrows the scope of the enactment by exempting innocent or inadvertent conduct.'"
Id. at 937.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals echoed the Seventh Circuit's holding. The
factual scenario in Featherston is analogous to the situation in which militia members
would be prosecuted under a state anti-paramilitary statute. In Featherston, a
structured group of activists, learned in the use of explosives, was ready to attack
transportation and communication facilities when the time was ripe, in anticipation
of "the coming revolution." Featherston, 461 F.2d at 1122. The court, quoting the
Supreme Court in Dennis v. United States, stated that if the "'Government is aware that
a group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to
commit them to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the
circumstances permit, action by the government is required.'" Id. (quoting Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509 (1950)).
The Dennis Court's ruling was clarified in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (per curiam). In Brandenburg, the Court held that the danger must be "immi-
nent" in order for it to be constitutionally proscribed. See id. at 447 (noting that the
speech must be aimed at "inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action"). The "clear and present danger" analysis refined
by the Brandenburg decision is not applicable to paramilitary organizations because
the threat of danger posed by militia members is abstract at best. See infra note 109
and accompanying text; see also supra notes 45-46, 55 and accompanying text.
71 U.S. CONST. amend. I. For a discussion of the First Amendment's applicability
to the states, see Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1937) (discussing the
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and asserting that "immunities that are
valid as against the federal government by force of the specific pledges of particular
amendments have been found to be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and
thus, through the Fourteenth Amendment, become valid as against the states"
(footnote omitted)).
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survive constitutional scrutiny, anti-organization statutes imper-
missibly violate the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of
speech and association.
A. Anti-Paramilitary Organization Statutes
1. Freedom of Speech Violation
Although the First Amendment's protection of expression is not
absolute,7 2 restrictions upon speech must be justifiable under an
appropriate level of judicial scrutiny. In determining the proper
level of scrutiny, two factors are particularly important: (1) the type
of speech regulated and (2) the method in which it is regulated. For
example, while political speech traditionally has been accorded the
utmost protection,73 obscene speech receives less judicial insula-
tion.74 Similarly, while a regulation directed at the content of
speech must survive the strictest scrutiny,75 a regulation targeting
conduct, but only incidentally abridging expression, faces less severe
judicial consideration. 76 Accordingly, anti-paramilitary organization
See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993) ("'[V]iolence
or other types of potentially expressive activities that produce special harms
distinct from their communicative impact ... are entitled to no constitutional
protection.'" (quoting Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984)));
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 (1982) (affirming that "[t]he
First Amendment does not protect violence"); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,
417 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (proclaiming that "[t]he right of free speech,
though precious, remains subject to reasonable accommodation to other valued
interests").
7 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995)
(proclaiming that "[w]hen a law burdens core political speech... 'exacting scrutiny'"
is applied); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 197 n.3 (1992) (noting that "regulation
of political speech in a public forum is valid only if it can survive strict scrutiny"
(citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461-62 (1980))).
7' See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (declaring that "[t]his much
had been settled by the Court, that obscene material is unprotected by the First
Amendment"); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("We hold that
obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected speech or press.").
' See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (emphasizing that
"[c]ontent-based restrictions are presumptively invalid" (citations omitted)); Police
Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating that "above all else, the First
Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because of
its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content" (citations omitted)).
76 See, e.g., Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2469 (1994)
(affirming that an "intermediate level of scrutiny [is] applicable to content-neutral
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech"); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (noting that "[a] regulation that serves purposes
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental
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statutes should be subject to the strictest level of scrutiny because
they conceivably abridge political speech due to its content. These
statutes fail to meet the Court's heightened scrutiny standard and,
therefore, constitute an unconstitutional infringement upon free
speech.
a. Political Speech Warrants Strict Constitutional Protection
The Supreme Court has continually discouraged the suppression
of political speech because such speech, although sometimes
disruptive, is integral to a free and democratic society." In fact,
the Court has explicitly declared the value of political speech most
potent when it does provoke a discordant element among people,
stating that speech "may indeed best serve its high purpose when it
induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions
as they are, or even stirs people to anger.""8 The Court has held
that restrictions on this important speech must be scrutinized under
the most stringent level of scrutiny.7 9
b. Anti-Paramilitary Organization Statutes Restrict Political Speech on
the Basis of Its Content
Proscriptions on paramilitary organization create the exact type
of restrictions on political speech that the Supreme Court deems
impermissible. In a sense, the majority of private militia can be
compared to political factions-individuals bound together by their
distrust of government and their desire to discuss and improve
government."' Although the method that militia members choose
to disseminate their message focuses on the military nature of their
organization, this fact does not detract from the predominant
purpose for which they convene-to condemn government abuses
and to explore ways to thwart such egregious conduct.8 1 Assuming
effect on some speakers or messages but not others").
7 See e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) (noting that "a function
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute.... It may strike
at prejudices and preconceptions and have profound unsettling effects as it presses
for acceptance of an idea").
7 8 Id.
7' See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44-45 (1976) (stating that "the constitu-
tionality of [the statute] turns on whether the governmental interests advanced in its
support satisfy the exacting scrutiny applicable to limitations on core First Amend-
ment rights of political expression").
s See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
s' See Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 115 S. Ct. 2338,
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that militia members convene for the primary purpose of expressing
grievances against the government, denying private militia the right
to organize is, therefore, analogous to preventing the creation of a
new political party. The consequence, silencing the potentially
valuable voices of militia members, is similar to stifling the outcry
of members of a new political faction. The concept of stifling
political organization simultaneously conflicts with the democratic
ideal while accurately depicting the purpose and effect of anti-
paramilitary organization statutes.8
2
Anti-paramilitary organization statutes do not merely "inciden-
tally" restrict political speech. Rather, they prohibit the ability to
engage in such speech precisely because of the political message
conveyed by the creation of paramilitary organizations. In other
words, anti-paramilitary organization statutes target the very content
of militia members' message-militia are the means of protecting
individual rights from the government--an integral element of
which is the military nature of their organizations.8 4 The inability
to create paramilitary organizations emasculates the message their
very existence is intended to convey. Presumably, legislators believe
that such a content-based restriction can be justified because the
substance of the message warrants suppression: 5 Paramilitary
organizations are fringe elements in society, and the majority does
not subscribe to the views being espoused. This reasoning,
however, conflicts with the very essence of the First Amendment. 6
2344-45 (1995) ("If there were no reason for a group of people to march from here
to there except to reach a destination, they could make the trip without expressing
any message beyond the fact of the march itself. Some people might call such a
procession a parade, but it would not be much of one.... Hence, we use the word
'parade' to indicate marchers who are making some sort of collective point, notjust
to each other but to bystanders along the way."). In an analogous manner, the militia
members organize themselves into military-style units not simply to conduct military
maneuvers; rather, their broader goal is to alert the public about the dangers of
government and the need to be assertive as a means of self-protection.
I See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963) (plurality opinion)
(recognizing that "'[a]ny interference with the freedom of a party is simultaneously
an interference with the freedom of its adherents. All political ideas cannot and
should not be channeled into the programs of our two major parties. History has
amply proved the virtue of political activity by minority, dissident groups'" (quoting
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250-51 (1957))).
s See supra part I.B.
s See, e.g., infra note 89 (referring to an unconstitutional statute that prohibited
the display of certain symbols). Bans on paramilitary organizations are analogous
because they deny militia members the ability to display their military attributes, a
symbol central to the message they aim to convey.
85 See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
' See Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 592 (1969) (proclaiming that "[i]t is firmly
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"If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it
is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an idea
simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagree-
able.""7 The creation of paramilitary organizations is quite obvi-
ously the expression of an idea, and, therefore, it merits First
Amendment protection accorded other conventional expressions of
ideas.
Speech that the majority finds offensive has often found
protection in the Constitution. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,"8 for
example, an ordinance prohibiting hate speech was held unconstitu-
tional.8 9 The Court declared that, although reprehensible, hate
speech was protected because "[t]he First Amendment does not
permit St. Paul to impose special prohibitions on those speakers
who express views on disfavored subjects"90 simply because these
particular subjects are disfavored.9 This same reasoning applies
settled that under our Constitution the public expression of ideas may not be
prohibited merely because the ideas are themselves offensive to some of their
hearers"); see also Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1949) ("There is no room
under our Constitution for a more restrictive view [of the freedom of speech]. [T]he
alternative would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts, or
dominant political or community groups.").
87 Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (citations omitted).
- 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
89 The ordinance in R.A.V. prohibited the display of symbols which one knew or
had reason to know would "arouse[ ] anger, alarm or resentment in others on the
basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender." Id. at 380. Specifically, the ordinance
made it illegal to
placet] on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.
ST. PAUL, MINN., LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990).
90 R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 391 (citations omitted).
9' This incident is reminiscent of the neo-Nazi march that was permitted in Skokie,
Illinois, a community with numerous Holocaust survivors who vehemently protested
the city's decision to allow the march. Although the Skokie neo-Nazis promoted an
unpopular view and seemingly posed a threat to the public peace, their First
Amendment interests were found to outweigh any ethical arguments that were
posited, as well as any threat to peace that was presented. The events in Skokie
"essentially ratif[ied] and reaffirm[ed] several decades of legal precedent guaranteeing
unpopular groups the right to demonstrate on public property." SAMUEL WALKER,
HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CONTROVERSY 120 (1994). For further
discussion of the decision to permit the march on Skokie and the First Amendment
consequences of that decision, see generally id. See also National Socialist Party v.
Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 43-44 (1977) (concluding that the Illinois Supreme
Court's denial of a stay of an injunction prohibiting the National Socialist Party of
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to anti-paramilitary organization statutes because, although the
existence of private militia as military entities promoting anti-
government sentiments does not conform to conventional notions
of political expression, this fact does not provide a relevant
distinction for silencing their voices.
c. The Restriction on Political Speech Fails to Meet the Appropriate Level
ofJudicial Scrutiny
Anti-paramilitary organization statutes implicate First Amend-
ment concerns because they constitute content-based restrictions on
speech. The very existence of paramilitary organizations is
inextricably intertwined with, and motivated by, strong anti-
government convictions and general despair about the domestic
political situation. 2 Anti-paramilitary organization statutes, which
result in a restriction of the content of these messages, are not
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interest in
domestic security and, therefore, fail to satisfy the requisite level of
constitutional scrutiny.
93
Unquestionably, the state has a valid interest in the safety of
society. This interest must not, however, overwhelm the extreme
desirability of protecting the right of the minority to speak out
against the majority, particularly with regard to political issues. 4
Without this right, the protests of the majority could silence the
voice of the minority9 5-an untenable prospect within a democratic
America's parade was improper because it would deny petitioners' First Amendment
rights during the period of appellate review).
See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
93 See, e.g., McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 1519 (1995)
(explaining that "[w]hen a law burdens core political speech, [the Court] appl[ies]
'exacting scrutiny' and uphold[s] the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve
an overriding state interest" (citation omitted)).
94See DONALD A. DOWNS, NAZIS IN SKOKIE: FREEDOM, COMMUNITY, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 2 (1985) (noting, with respect to the "fears and counter-threats of
violence engendered at Skokie," that "political speech shall not be abridged because of
its content, even if that content is verbally assaultive and has an emotionally painful
impact" (footnotes omitted)).
" This phenomenon, the ability of one group to inhibit the speech of another, is
commonly referred to as the "heckler's veto." See id. at 9 (stating that "[b]ecause of
this conflict, the Supreme Court reinforced the protection of speech ... by
prohibiting the abridgement of speech due to the reaction of a 'hostile audience'"
(footnotes omitted)); WALKER, supra note 91, at 71 ("Many of the actions of
controversial groups were and are deliberately provocative.... The underlying
question [is] whether one person's right to speak [can] be restricted because of
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government.0 6
In spite of these valuable concerns for democratic integrity, it
is apparent that, even if the state's interest in protecting public
safety were compelling, anti-paramilitary organization statutes are
not narrowly tailored to this interest. An outright ban on the
right of militia members to convene as military entities prevents not
only discussion regarding the government but also dialogue
concerning any topic militia members may choose to discuss. Such
a prohibition singlehandedly eradicates political speech that may
serve a vital role in the functions of a democratic society. Anti-
paramilitary organization statutes, therefore, constitute an unconsti-
tutional violation of the First Amendment guarantee to freedom of
speech.
2. Freedom of Association Violation
The First Amendment protects the "right of the people
peaceably to assemble."97 Alexis de Tocqueville, emphasizing the
importance of this right, wrote that
[t]he most natural privilege of man, next to the right of acting for
himself, is that of combining his exertions with those of his fellow
creatures and of acting in common with them. The right of
association therefore appears to [be] almost as inalienable in its
nature as the right of personal liberty. No legislator can attack it
without impairing the foundations of society.
98
The prohibition on association fostered by anti-paramilitary
organization statutes denies individuals a fundamental means of
voicing their opinions and is unconstitutional under the Supreme
Court's association jurisprudence.
99
threatened (or actual) violence by the audience.").
' In fact, our government has a vested interest in fostering the expression of
minority opinions. A fundamental tenet of a democratic society is that anti-
government expression has "serious ... political ... value." R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 418 (1992) (Stevens,J., concurring) (quoting Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)).
97 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
98 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 203 (Vintage Books 1954)
(1848).
" See infra part III.A.2.c.
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a. Freedom of Association Warrants Protection Similar to That Awarded
Freedom of Speech
The Supreme Court, recognizing the right to freedom of associa-
tion0 0 as a concomitant extension of other First Amendment
rights, has proclaimed that "[a]n individual's freedom to speak, to
worship, and to petition the government for the redress of griev-
ances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the
State, unless a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward
those ends was not also guaranteed."0 1 By providing individuals
with an additional means of expressing their views, freedom of
association assumes the same fundamental role as freedom of
speech in a democratic society. "The freedom to associate applies
to the beliefs we share and to those we consider reprehensible. It
tends to produce the diversity of opinion that oils the machinery of
democratic government and insures peaceful, orderly change."
0 2
b. Anti-Paramilitary Organization Statutes Infringe upon the Right of
Militia Members to Assemble
A prohibition against paramilitary organization implicates the
First Amendment's grant of free association, as the liberty to
convene and address concerns regarding the government is a
necessary complement to militia members' right to engage in
political discourse.' 3 The Court, acknowledging the significance
that freedom of association assumes in society, has proclaimed that
"the practice of persons sharing common views banding together to
achieve a common end is deeply embedded in the American
political process .... [And] by collective effort individuals can make
their views known, when, individually, their voices would be faint or
lost.""0 4 Militia members join together in an effort to convincingly
'" The Supreme Court has identified two prongs of the right to free association:
freedom of intimate association, which implicates due process concerns, and freedom
of expressive association. See Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-18
(1984) (noting that the two prongs coincide in cases in which the state interferes with
an individual's ability to select those with whom they wish to join in a common
endeavor). This Comment is solely concerned with the freedom of expressive
association.
'o' Id. at 622 (citation omitted).
'0 Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 575 (1974).
10 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (stating that
"[e]ffective advocacy of both public and private points of view, particularly
controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association").
"0 Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley,
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and forcefully promote their opinions. Denying them the liberty to
convene as a group, therefore, effectively deprives them of the
ability to disseminate these views.
Proponents of anti-paramilitary organization statutes may justify
their position on the basis that the motivations underlying militia
association-mistrust and fear of the government-are unorthodox.
Yet, as in the realm of free speech, the freedom of association
analysis renders unconstitutional statutes that proscribe organization
based solely on majority dislike or distrust." 5 Thus, the inquiry
turns to whether these statutes can be justified on any other
grounds in light of the Supreme Court's freedom of association
jurisprudence.
c. The Restrictions Imposed on Association Cannot Survive Judicial
Scrutiny
The freedom to associate is not absolute. Groups who gather to
engage in violent acts, for example, do not warrant constitutional
protection. 10 6 On the other hand, "'the mere abstract teaching
S. . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to
force and violence[] is not the same as preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action.'"107 In fact, the Court has
noted that "'a blanket prohibition of association with a group having
both legal and illegal aims' would present 'a real danger that
legitimate political expression or association would be
impaired.'"'10
454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
105 See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622 (proclaiming that "[a]ccording protection to
collective effort on behalf of shared goals is especially important in preserving
political and cultural diversity and in shielding dissident expression from suppression
by the majority" (citations omitted)); see also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377,
382 (1992) (noting that "[t]he First Amendment generally prevents government from
proscribing speech, or even expressive conduct, because of disapproval of the ideas
expressed" (citations omitted)).
" See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (stating that "violence or other types of potentially
expressive activities that produce special harms distinct from their communicative
impact ... are entitled to no constitutional protection" (citing Runyon v. McCrary,
427 U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976))); see also Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 75 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that "violence has no sanctuary in the First
Amendment, and the use of weapons, gunpowder, and gasoline may not constitution-
ally masquerade under the guise of 'advocacy'").
107 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982) (quoting Noto
v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297-98 (1961)).
108 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 919 (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 229
(1961)). The Claiborne Court expanded upon this point:
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The inconclusive manner in which militia members discuss the
potential use of force to fulfill their goals should be characterized as
"abstract teaching."' 0 9 Moreover, while the use of such force may
be illegal, militia promote other legal goals, such as publicizing
government abuse and advocating the preservation of state and
"[I]f the persons assembling have committed crimes elsewhere, if they have
formed or are engaged in a conspiracy against the public peace and order,
they may be prosecuted for their conspiracy or other violation of valid laws.
But it is a different matter when the State, instead of prosecuting them for
such offenses, seizes upon mere participation in a peaceable assembly and
a lawful public discussion as the basis for a criminal charge."
Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 908-09 (quoting Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 365 (1937)).
But see Application of Cassidy, 51 N.Y.S.2d 202,205 (App. Div. 1944), affd, 73 N.E.2d
41 (1947). Cassidy concerned the denial of a Bar application on the account of the
applicant's membership in a group that advocated the overthrow of government. The
court proclaimed:
The applicant has the right, of course, to advocate that the Constitution
be changed and that those charged with the administration of the govern-
ment be removed from office .... But this right contemplates only the
advocacy of legal and constitutional means of change [and] [i]t is lost when
it is abused by urging the use of illegal and unconstitutional methods ....
... [T]he very fact that he advocated the creation of such a private
army demonstrates his unfitness to become a member of the Bar of this
State. There can be no justification for the organization of such an armed
force. Its existence would be incompatible with the fundamental concept
of our form of government... [and] would be sufficient, without more, to
prevent a democratic form of government, such as ours, from functioning
freely, without coercion, and in accordance with the constitutional man-
dates.
Id.
109 For example:
[Tihe prospect of fighting some day play[s] a prominent part in the group's
strategy and rhetoric.
Militia members stress[], however, that their armament is strictly for
defensive purposes. "We are not a subversive group. We are not intent on
overthrowing the American government .... We believe that everything we
are doing is completely lawful and we intend to stay that wayjust as long as
possible."
Billin, supra note 37, at A5. The concept of "abstract teaching" was initially referred
to by the Court to draw a distinction between advocacy and "preparing a group for
violent action and steeling it to such action." Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290,
298 (1961); see also Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 688 (1972) ("Advocacy of basic
fundamental changes in government ... is within the protection of the First
Amendment even when it is restrictively construed.") (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Modern militia do not currently appear to be preparing for violent action against the
government. Rather, they prepare for the undecided day in the future when force
may, or may not, become a necessity. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text.
1996] 1619
1620 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1593
individual rights."1 ' By prohibiting militia members from associat-
ing, anti-paramilitary organization statutes, therefore, pose a "real
danger" of stifling valuable legal expression.' This suppression
can only be justified if the statutes are narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental interest.'
12
The government's interest in the preservation of peace as a
justification for prohibiting paramilitary association initially appears
to serve a compelling interest. However, the prohibition divests
militia members of a crucial means of group expression, thereby
completely suppressing an unpopular view. Again, as the expression
of divergent views is fundamental to, and beneficial for, a democra-
tic society, 113 a ban on groups organized to express such views
simply cannot be said to serve a "compelling" governmental interest.
Even if the prohibition of private militia association served a
compelling interest, anti-paramilitary organization statutes would
still be unconstitutional because they fail to satisfy the narrowly
tailored prong of the Court's association test.114 A complete ban
on the creation of private militia clearly represents an overbroad
means of addressing any "compelling" threat. This total prohibi-
tion, therefore, prevents militia members from convening to
promote any views, whether or not they are directed at the
government. Such an outright prohibition is completely at odds
with our democratic society 1 5 and cannot be said to be the
"narrowest" means of serving any compelling governmental interest.
Anti-paramilitary organization statutes, therefore, violate the First
Amendment's right to freedom of association.
no See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
See Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928 (noting that the speeches under review called for
Blacks to unify, but that as long as no lawless action was incited, this activity was
protected).
112 See, e.g., Roberts v. United StatesJaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984) (declaring
that "[i]nfringements on [the right to associate] may be justified by regulations
adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas that
cannot be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational
freedoms"); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460-61 (1958) (noting
that governmental "action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to
associate is subject to the closest scrutiny").
.. See supra note 105 (emphasizing the importance of minority expression).
114 See, e.g., Roberts, 468 U.S. at 623 (noting that restrictions on association are only
permissible when a compelling state interest cannot be achieved through less
restrictive means).
11 See, e.g., supra notes 82-86, 105 (emphasizing the importance of unpopular
views in a democratic society).
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B. Anti-Paramilitary Training Statutes
1. Traditional Free Speech and Free Association
Tests Do Not Apply
Traditional freedom of speech and freedom of association
concerns are not applicable to anti-paramilitary training statutes.
Although the ability to train constitutes an essential function of
private militia's existence, their training activity
does not fall under the purview of free speech analysis because
it is not pure speech. Rather, paramilitary training constitutes
expressive conduct that potentially merits First Amendment
protection116 Similarly, freedom of association tests do not
apply to anti-paramilitary training statutes because these stat-
utes are not aimed at paramilitary organization per se, rather
they target the activities of militia members who have
already exercised their right to associate by creating a specific
organization.
2. Speech v. Conduct: Protected Expression?
a. Paramilitary Training May Not Even Be Protected "Expressive
Conduct"
Although, paramilitary training is not pure speech, it cannot be
denied that militia intend their training to impart a message:
namely, that the federal government has overstepped its bounds and
is infringing upon individual rights." 7 In evaluating whether such
116 See infra part III.B.2.
17 Many militia members perceive the federal government as tyrannical, and
they believe that the threat of armed resistance is the way to reestablish an
equilibrium between the people and the government. Militia members believe that
a free state
is found in the citizenry being trained, organized, equipped and led properly
so that IF THE GOVERNMENT USES ITS FORCE AGAINST THE
CITIZENS, THE PEOPLE CAN RESPOND WITH A SUPERIOR AMOUNT
OF ARMS, AND APPROPRIATELY DEFEND THEIR RIGHTS
One of the prime reasons for an alert and vigilant militia is that when
the federal government is instituted among men for the purpose of
protecting their rights and liberties, and they turn against the people who
empower them... it is the DUTY of man to put on the cloak of liberty for
the sake of protecting mankind from the federal government that is out of
control and that has transformed itself into a tyrant.
Jim Faulkner, Why There Is a Need for the Militia in America, FEDERAL LANDS UPDATE,
Oct. 1994, at 1, 6; see also supra notes 47-48 and accompanying text.
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implied expression warrants First Amendment protection, the
first issue to consider is whether the Supreme Court will even
recognize training as expression. In determining whether conduct
is expressive, the Court asks "whether '[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message [is] present, and [whether] the likelihood [is]
great that the message [will] be understood by those who view[]
it.,"
11 8
Paramilitary organizations clearly intend to convey a message by
their training activity-such training reveals militia's allegiance to the
ideal that society needs to be protected from the federal govern-
ment and that a trained militia is the proper means of providing this
protection. Militia members believe that further erosion of
individual rights can be stymied by an organization prepared to
defend constitutional principles.1 1 9 They train, therefore, as an
expression of their willingness to engage in a confrontation with the
government, should such confrontation become necessary to defend
their beliefs.
Militia training is, therefore, directed at imparting a message.
It is doubtful, however, that paramilitary training is understood
to convey militia ideas. Instead, it is clear that private militia,
and their training activities, are misperceived and mischaracterized
by the general public. For the most part, militia adherents are
seen as threatening and destructive gun-bearing members of
society. 120  It is apparent, therefore, that militia members are
failing to convey the message intended by their training activity.
Hence, paramilitary training activity probably does not merit any
First Amendment protection, as the likelihood is great that the
Court would not consider such training to be protected expres-
sion.'
21
118 Texas v.Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,404 (1989) (quotingSpence v. Washington, 418
U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)).
19 See supra note 117.
.2o Seesupra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (noting that the public perceives
militia as paranoid, violent groups).
121 Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404 (noting that if society fails to grasp the expressive
elements of conduct, such conduct should not be granted First Amendment
protection).
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b. Paramilitary Training Can Be Constitutionally Proscribed By Statute
Even If It Is Considered Expression
Even if paramilitary training contains elements of protected
expression, 122 this right to expression is not absolute.1 23 In Unit-
ed States v. O'Brien,124 the Supreme Court established a four-prong
test for evaluating statutes that regulate activity that contains
"speech and non-speech elements." 125 The Court held that
12 The message militia members aspire to convey by training--training which
necessitates being armed and prepared to fight-is that of disenchantment with the
federal government and belief in the restoration of individual rights. In this respect,
paramilitary training may encompass elements of expressive conduct.
For an opposing view, see Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku
Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198 (S.D. Tex. 1982). Vietnamese Fishermen's involved a clash
between the Ku Klux Klan and a group of immigrant Vietnamese fisherman in Texas.
The Ku Klux Klan operated a military arm called the Texas Emergency Reserve
("TER"), a structured group trained in combat techniques, the use of sophisticated
weaponry, and other military procedures. See id. at 203-04. On March 15, 1981, TER
members rode in a boat through an area where the Vietnamese were located. See id.
at 206-07. During the ride, TER members openly exhibited their weapons and
prominently displayed an effigy of a Vietnamese fisherman. See id. The Ku Klux
Klan was charged with violating Texas's anti-paramilitary statute, and the court was
faced with the issue of whether it could enjoin the Ku Klux Klan and the TER from
operating their military training camps.
The Vietnamese Fishermen's court asserted that the Ku Klux Klan's activities could
appropriately be curtailed under the O'Brien speech-conduct analysis. For an
explanation of the O'Brien analysis, see infra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
The court held that "[d]efendants' conduct of military operations involves such grave
interferences with the public peace and such minimal elements of communication,
that, the Court views these activities as impermissible 'conduct' not 'speech.'" Id. at
208. The court further held that the state
pursuant to its police power, may enact and enforce laws to provide for the
public safety and to protect its citizens from the threat of violence.... [and]
to further the governmental interest of protecting citizens from the threat
of violence posed by private military organizations. This is a vital govern-
mental interest because the proliferation of private military organizations
threatens to result in lawlessness and destructive chaos.
Id. at 216 (citations omitted).
For a detailed description of the incident, see id. at 203-07. See also MouIs DEES
& STEVE FIFFER, A SEASON FORJUSTICE 22-50 (1991) (Morris Dees, co-founder of the
Southern Poverty Law Center and Klanwatch, was one of the attorneys that
prosecuted the case on behalf of the Vietnamese fishermen); BILL STANTON,
KLANWATCH: BRINGING THE Ku KLUX KLAN TOJUSTICE 88-108 (1991).
123 See supra note 72.
124 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
125 Id. at 376 (asserting that "[w]e cannot accept the view that an apparently
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in
the conduct intends thereby to express an idea").
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[a] government regulation [on such activity] is sufficiently justified
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that interest.
26
Based on these criteria, anti-paramilitary training statutes are a valid
limitation on First Amendment freedoms.
Anti-paramilitary training statutes satisfy each of the O'Brien
criteria. First, the state is constitutionally empowered to promul-
gate laws directed at regulating the militia. 12  Second, these laws
presumably further the important and substantial governmental
interest 128 of preserving domestic security. 129  Anti-paramilitary
training statutes, which target the use of firearms or explosive
devices with the intent to cause civil disorder, serve the viable state
interest of maintaining public peace and safety.'3 0
The third prong of the O'Brien test is similarly satisfied, as the
purpose underlying anti-paramilitary training statutes is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression. 1 1 This factor merits
further explanation because it is particularly important with respect
to comprehending why anti-training statutes do not unconstitution-
ally infringe on First Amendment rights.
The O'Brien Court held that burning Selective Service registra-
tion certificates in an effort to convince others to adopt anti-war
sentiments was not expression worthy of First Amendment protec-
tion.132 Importantly, the Court concluded that the government
interest in criminalizing the destruction of draft cards was "limited
to preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the
Selective Service System"13 3 and did "not punish only destruction
126 Id. at 377.
12
1 See infra part IV (discussing the state's power in this regard).
128 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (setting out the "substantial governmental interest"
test).
'2 See supra text accompanying note 69 (stating that domestic security is the
primary reason for promulgating these statutes).
l" See supra text accompanying note 69.
'1 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (pointing out that the governmental purpose must
be unrelated to the suppression of free expression).
2 See id. at 376-82 (rejecting the view that "an apparently limitless variety of
conduct can be labelled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct
intends thereby to express an ided").
... Id. at 382; see also id. at 377-80 (concluding that "[t]he issuance of certificates
indicating the registration and eligibility classification of individuals is a legitimate
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engaged in for the purpose of expressing views."134 Rather, the
law targeted conduct that specifically resulted in harm to the
Selective Service. The statute, in other words, was not aimed at the
suppression of free expression.
The O'Brien analysis initially appears to clash with the Court's
more recent decision in Texas v. Johnson."5 In Johnson, the Court
held that burning an American flag as an act of protest against the
government was constitutionally protected expression. The Court
proclaimed that "[t]he expressive, overtly political nature of this act
was both intentional and overwhelmingly apparent." 3 6 The anti-
flag burning statute was deemed unconstitutional because the
protestor was "prosecuted for his expression of dissatisfaction with
the policies of this country, expression situated at the core of our
First Amendment values."
3 7
A critical distinction exists between Johnson's flag burning and
O'Brien's burning of draft cards, a distinction that explains why only
the former conduct merited constitutional protection. In Johnson,
the asserted government interest directly implicated the expression,
whereas in O'Brien, the government interest was unrelated to the
expression. 13  Permitting destruction of draft cards would effec-
tively eliminate the very reason for their creation-institution of a
systematic form of administration, identification, and notification.
In contrast, flag burning was criminalized because of the state's
interest in "preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and
national unity."' Punishing draft card burning to protest the
government, in violation of a statute promulgated to promote
efficient government administration, differs significantly from
punishing flag burning as an act of political protest in contravention
of a statute designed to preserve a political symbol. The interest
and substantial administrative aid in the functioning of [the registration] system" and
listing the purposes "in addition to initial notification... [that] would be defeated
by the certificates' destruction or mutilation").
134 Id. at 375.
m 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
"RId. at 406. In an earlier case, the Court held that flag burning "was not an act
of mindless nihilism. Rather, it was a pointed expression of anguish by appellant
about the then-current domestic and foreign affairs of his government." Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410 (1974).
" Johnson, 491 U.S. at 411.
I's See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 381-82 (emphasizing that the governmental interest
must be unrelated to expression).
1"'Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407 (citing national unity as one of two government
interests allegedly justifying the anti-flag burning statute).
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asserted in the latter directly implicates the specific conduct
proscribed. 
140
The Supreme Court has proclaimed that "nonverbal expressive
activity can be banned because of the action it entails, but not
because of the ideas it expresses."14 1 Hence, the O'Brien statute
passed constitutional muster precisely because the law strove to
prevent harm to the Selective Service system that would result from
draft cards being destroyed. Likewise, the Johnson statute was struck
down on the grounds that the harm it aimed to prevent by prohibit-
ing flag burning, the expression of anti-government sentiment,
directly implicated the political message conveyed by the activity.
In light of O'Brien and Johnson it becomes evident that the
government's interests in anti-paramilitary training statutes are
unrelated to the suppression of free expression. If these statutes
specifically outlawed the use of firearms for a disruption aimed at the
government, constitutional questions would arise. 4 2  Yet these
statutes prohibit conduct intended to incite civil disorder for
whatever purpose and do not specify the object of the intended civil
disorder.'43 The state's desire to prevent violence and harm to the
140 Thus, the Court in Johnson stated:
The State, apparently, is concerned that such conduct will lead people to
believe either that the flag does not stand for nationhood and national
unity, but instead reflects other, less positive concepts, or that the concepts
reflected in the flag do not in fact exist, that is, that we do not enjoy unity
as a Nation. These concerns blossom only when a person's treatment of the
flag communicates some message, and thus are related "to the suppression
of free expression" within the meaning of O'Brien.
Id. at 410.
R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 385 (1992). The Court stated that
"burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against outdoor fires could be punishable,
whereas burning a flag in violation of an ordinance against dishonoring the flag is
not." Id. at 385. Applying this logic to the present scenario, banning arms training
to uphold an ordinance which prohibits shooting in unauthorized areas would be
allowed, while banning arms training because it violates a law against protesting the
government in a potentially threatening manner would presumably be unconstitu-
tional.
142 Specifically, the specter of a prohibition on political expression because of the
content of that expression would be raised. For a discussion of content-based
restrictions on expression, see supra part III.A.l.a.
"The O'Brien Court distinguished draft card burning from a case
where the alleged governmental interest in regulating conduct arises in
some measure because the communication allegedly integral to the conduct
is itself thought to be harmful.... [F]or example, this Court struck down
a statutory phrase which punished people who expressed their 'opposition
to organized government' by displaying 'any flag, badge, banner, or device.'
Since the statute there was aimed at suppressing communication it could
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community is certainly unrelated to the message that paramilitary
organizations hope to convey. The statutes instead address solely
the means by which these messages are communicated.144 For this
reason, anti-paramilitary training statutes satisfy the third prong of
the O'Brien test.
In accordance with the fourth criteria of O'Brien, anti-paramili-
tary training statutes do not infringe First Amendment rights to
any greater extent than is necessary.1 45  Because these statutes
address the techniques upon which militia members rely to express
their views, as opposed to the substance of these views, any
infringement on the freedoms of speech and association is neglig-
ible. 146 Militia members are not prevented from verbalizing their
disenchantment with the federal government; they are merely
prohibited from expressing it in a specific manner. There are
numerous other ways in which militia members can band together
as military entities to espouse their views legally, without resorting
to weapons training and military maneuvers intended to create civil
disturbances.
147
In summary, anti-paramilitary training statutes target conduct,
not expression, and are, therefore, a constitutional limitation on
militia members' First Amendment rights. 14' Thus, if, under the
not be sustained as a regulation of noncommunicative conduct.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382 (citing Stromberg v. State of California, 283 U.S. 359, 361
(1931)).
Similarly, anti-paramilitary training statutes do not specifically outlaw the use of
firearms for the purpose of disrupting the government. Rather, they generally
prohibit conduct intended to incite disorder, regardless of the target of the conduct.
If the statutes instead criminalized behavior specifically directed towards the
government, the First Amendment would likely be violated.
144 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 63-64 (providing examples of anti-
paramilitary training statutes).
I'5 See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (illustrating the final First Amendment concern
that incidental restrictions be "no greater than is essential" to further the state
interest).
16 The Court allows such negligible infringement upon First Amendment
freedoms when the state's interest is particularly important. For example, the Court
has allowed restrictions on free speech in obscenity cases due to the numerous critical
state interests involved. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58
(1973) ("[T]here are legitimate state interests at stake in stemming the tide of
commercialized obscenity.... These include the interest of the public in the quality
of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the great city
centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself.").
147 For examples of non-dangerous militia activity, see supra notes 49-53 and
accompanying text. See also supra note 41 (discussing the increasing use of computer
discussion among militia members).
4' The Court has stated that "[w]here the government does not target conduct on
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Second Amendment, state governments possess the power to
proscribe paramilitary training activity, anti-paramilitary training
statutes are not unconstitutional.
IV. A WELL REGULATED MILITIA
The Second Amendment states that "A well regulated Militia,
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the
people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."1 4' The
meaning of the Second Amendment is one of the most contested
issues in constitutional law. 50 This Part will analyze the con-
stitutionality of prohibiting militia training under prevailing
Second Amendment jurisprudence in order to determine whether
the states can rely on judicial doctrine to regulate this conduct
lawfully.
Paramilitary organizations naturally believe in their right to
assemble and operate as a private militia and, hence, in their right
to bear arms. Paramilitary organizations rely on the Second
Amendment not only to justify their existence, but also to demon-
strate the possible government subjugation of individual rights.
Because these organizations believe that the Second Amendment
affords them a constitutional right to train as a "militia," attempts
to stifle this activity exemplify the oppressive government that gave
rise to their existence.
151
the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely
because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy." R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,
505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992).
149 U.S. CONST. amend. II.
15 "According to an American Bar Association report of 1975, there
is less agreement, more misinformation, and less understanding of the right
of citizens to keep and bear arms than on any other current controversial
constitutional issue." MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 135; see also id. at 136
("Two hundred years after [the Militia Clause's] passage there is no agreement
why it is there or what it means. Was it me'ant to restrict the right to have
arms to militia members; to indicate the most pressing reason for an armed
citizenry; or simply to proclaim the need for a free people to have a conscript,
rather than a professional, army? And what sort of militia did the framers have in
mind ... ?").
151 See FIELD MANUAL, supra note 19, § 1.1.4 ("If you do what is
Constitutionally right by forming a militia and the government accuses
you of wrongdoing, then in fact they have lost all authority because
they have turned away from the very thing which legitimizes them [the Constitu-
tion].").
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A. Who Constitutes the Militia?
Any meaningful discussion of the regulation of paramilitary
activity must begin with a determination of the scope of the
Militia Clause. The question of who constitutes the militia
has spawned considerable debate. Although a literal interpreta-
tion appears to lend credence to the position that private militia
have a constitutional right to train, a legal analysis of who is
vested with the power to control the militia leads to the opposite
conclusion.
The militia was originally conceived as a citizens' army.
152
At the time the Second Amendment was ratified, the militia was
believed to comprise the whole people of the United States.
153
Subsequent interpretation and legislation have adhered to this
original belief. A federal statute states that the militia "con-
sists of all able-bodied males at least 17 years of age and ...
under 45 years of age who are, or who have made a declaration of
intention to become, citizens of the United States." 154 Addition-
ally, the Supreme Court has proclaimed that the militia is "com-
prised of all males physically capable of acting in concert for
the common defense."15 5 Literally, therefore, the male members
of today's paramilitary organizations do comprise the militia.
The fact that the militia is literally composed of the whole people,
however, does not mean that it is free from governmental regula-
tion.
11
2 See supra notes 21-28 (discussing the development of the militia from England's
citizen's army).
'" George Mason, a renowned Anti-Federalist and drafter of the Virginia
Declaration of Rights, at the Virginia Constitution ratification convention of 1788
proclaimed: "[Wiho are the militia, if they not be the people of this country... ? Who are
the militia? They consist now of the whole people .... Under the present government, all
ranks of people are subject to militia duty." CLAYrON E. CRAMER, FOR THE DEFENSE OF
THEMSELVES AND THE STATE: THE ORIGINAL INTENT AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 9 (1994).
For an argument that "an individual cannot merely identify himself as a member
of an inactive state militia or as a member of a private paramilitary organization
which calls itself a'militia' in order to invoke the Second Amendment guarantee," see
KLAUSNER, supra note 60, at 6.
' 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1994).
'5 United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 179 (1939) (holding that the National
Firearms Act, which prohibited transportation of a 12-gauge shotgun with a barrel
less than 18 inches long, did not violate the Second Amendment).
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B. Regulation of the Militia
1. Power to Regulate the Militia Is Beyond
the Reach of the Federal Government
In order to comprehend the Militia Clause of the Second
Amendment, it is necessary to understand the context in which it
was adopted and the reasons for its incorporation into the Constitu-
tion. During the Constitutional Convention and the ratification
debates, the question of the need for a militia exemplified the
divisive discussion over the allocation of power between the federal
and state governments.1 56 Federalists and Anti-Federalists argued
over the anticipated effectiveness of a militia as a balance to
governmental power.1 57 The Federalists contended that a citizens'
militia would be large enough to counter a standing army, while the
Anti-Federalists argued that the federal government was granted too
much control over the militia. 5 ' Dialogue also began to take
shape as to whether the right to bear arms was an individual right,
with the Federalists asserting that an individual right would act to
further quell concern about an overbearing army run by the federal
government. 59 In the end, the Second Amendment reflected a
compromise between Federalist and Anti-Federalist concerns about
a militia as a check on the federal government. 6 The Militia
-6 See MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 155-59 (elaborating on the dissension over the
militia issue during the ratification debates); see also Jay R. Wagner, Comment, Gun
Control Legislation and the Intent of the Second Amendment: To What Extent Is There an
Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms?, 37 VILL. L. REV. 1407, 1421-22 (1992)
(providing a general legislative history of the Second Amendment and a look at the
particular debates at the Constitutional Convention).
157 See Fields & Hardy, supra note 17, at 33 (elaborating on tle difference between
the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists in their positions on this issue).
158 See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 29, at 182-87 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton
Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing the Federalist position that, "[i]f standing armies are
dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over the militia in the same body ought,
as far as possible, to take away the inducement and the pretext to such unfriendly
institutions" and that "if circumstances should at any time oblige the government to
form an army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the liberties of
the people while there is a large body of citizens... who stand ready to defend their
own rights and those of their fellow citizens"); Dougherty, supra note 20, at 964-65
("The Federalists, who argued for a powerful federal government, wanted nearly
complete federal control of the militia. The Anti-Federalists, who strove to maintain
substantial power in the stite governments, feared any federal control over their state
militias." (footnotes omitted)).
... See Fields & Hardy, supra note 17, at 35 (observing the Federalist argument that
an armed populace would prevent the "enforce[ment of] unjust laws by the sword").
" "A compromise was reached whereby the federal government would maintain
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Clause was intended to provide a balance to the potential threat of
tyranny posed by granting the federal government power to
maintain a standing army under Article I, Section 8, Clauses 15 and
16 of the Constitution. 16 ' Thus, the limitation imposed on the
government's power over militia was intended to restrict the federal
government, not state governments.
162
2. State Governments Retain the Power
to Regulate the Militia
Even though it is apparent that regulation of the militia
falls outside the scope of the federal government's power, it has
not always been clear whether the state governments retained the
power to regulate the militia or whether the militia was reserved
exclusively to the people of the state, free from any governmental
regulation.
The question now appears to be largely settled. Power
to control and regulate the militia is reserved to state govern-
ments. This power has not been delegated to the individual.
The Second Amendment right to a well regulated militia, there-
fore, is not an individual right. 6 ' The state, not the
a standing army plus have the authority to regulate and call out the militia, and the
states would have the authority over the militia except when it was called into federal
service." John Levin, The Right to Bear Arms: The Development of the American
Experience, 48 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 148, 156 (1971), reprinted in KRUSCHKE, supra note
20, at 17.
16 See Don B. Kates,Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaningofthe Second
Amendment, 82 MIcH. L. REv. 204, 211-12 (1983) ("Proponents of the exclusively
state's right view see the amendment as responding to article I, section 8, clauses 15
and 16, of the original Constitution.").
112 See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (stating that the Second
Amendment "is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the national
government, and not upon that of the state"). The Presser Court reaffirmed its earlier
holding in United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875), that the Second
Amendment "means no more than that [the right to bear arms] shall not be infringed
by Congress... [and] that [it] has no other effect than to restrict the powers of the
national government." Id.; see also KRUSCHKE, supra note 20, at 154 (arguing that
"[tihe Court asserted that the Second Amendment limited the powers of the
Congress, not the power of the states").
" Hence, although the definition of who constitutes the militia sweeps broadly,
the militia are constrained by the state's power to establish who, among those eligible
by definition, will act as a militia when required:
[I]n the context of the Constitution, the militia was viewed as a state-
organized, state run body; it was not simply a term for the citizenry at large.
Indeed, even though the militias were composed of a large body of male
citizens, the militias were seen as state units which could be armed by the
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individual, organizes and maintains a militia comprised of the
citizenry.
As early as 1886, in Presser v. Illinois,1 the Supreme Court
held that state enactment of legislation prohibiting private military
organizations was constitutional. 6 ' The Court proclaimed:
The right voluntarily to associate together as a military company
or organization . . . without, and independent of, an act of
congress or law of the state authorizing the same, is not an
attribute of national citizenship. Military organization and military
drill and parade under arms are subjects especially under the
control of the government of every country. They cannot be
claimed as a right independent of law. Under our political system
they are subject to the regulation and control of the state and federal
governments .... 166
Thus, Presser stands for the crucial proposition that power to
regulate the militia is conferred upon the state governments and
that individuals associating as a private military organization, in
contravention of a state statute proscribing such association, can be
successfully and constitutionally prosecuted.
Both prior to and after the Presser opinion, the Supreme Court
has proclaimed that the Second Amendment grants the state power
to institute any obligations or restrictions it desires on militia. 67
government, and which could be called out by the states to quash rebellions,
enforce laws, and defend the state from invasion.
Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 16, at 24; see also id. at 56 (proclaiming that an
"historical account [of the Second Amendment] shows [that] the amendment was
intended to protect state interests against federal power, not individual rights against
state power").
164 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
165 See id. at 267.
' Id. (emphasis added). The plaintiff in Presser, who was marching with an armed
group that presented itself as a military organization independent of the state's
organized militia, was charged with violating a state statute that made it unlawful for
.'any body of men whatever, other than the regular organized volunteer militia of this
state, and the troops of the United States, to associate themselves together as a
military company or organization, or to drill or parade with arms.'" Id. at 253. The
Court proclaimed that, in the interest of maintaining "public peace, safety, and good
order," id. at 268, the State possessed the power to regulate military associations. See
id. at 267-68.
67 See United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (arguing that the,
Second Amendment only restricts federal governmental power, but is silent as to the
states); see also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-79 (1939) (contrasting the
state's military responsibility with that of the federal government's, stating that "[t]he
Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast with the
Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress");
KRUSCHKE, supra note 20, at 27 ("The central point of the opinion, however, was to
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In 1934, the Court proclaimed that "[u]ndoubtedly every state has
authority to train its able-bodied male citizens of suitable age
appropriately to develop fitness, should any such duty be laid upon
them, to serve ... in state militia."16 The Court further asserted
that the "State is the solejudge of the means to be employed and the
amount of training to be exacted for the effective accomplishment
of these ends."
169
It is clear, therefore, that the state has the power to regulate
private militia. Thus, private individuals banding together under
the guise of forming a militia and legally coexisting with the state-
regulated militia can be lawfully proscribed. It would be logical to
conclude, therefore, that today's paramilitary organizations, which
maintain absolutely no affiliation with the state, can be constitution-
ally regulated. Paramilitary organizations will certainly assert,
however, that their right to exist as a militia independent of the
"state" militia, and free from government regulation, stems from
their general right to bear arms granted by the Second Amendment.
state [that] the Second Amendment did not apply to state governments, and [that]
such governments could pass whatever legislation they desired without fear of federal
sanction.").
Although detailed discussion about the debate on whether the Second
Amendment is incorporated into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment exceeds the scope of this Comment, it merits some note. Modern
jurisprudence appears to reject the view that the Second Amendment has been
incorporated so as to apply against the states. This view comports with the judicial
position that the Second Amendment does not confer an individual right to keep and
bear arms. See, e.g., Kates, supra note 161, at 257 ("[T]he only viable justification for
denying incorporation of the second amendment against the states today is the
exclusively state's right view that the amendment does not confer an individual right.
If the amendment only guaranteed a right of the states it would be self contradictory
to incorporate it into the fourteenth amendment."). On the other hand, the
incorporation question has generated academic debate to the contrary which would
imply that the Second Amendment is a grant of an individual right. See, e.g., Sanford
Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 652 (1989) ("[T]he
opponents of gun control appear to take a 'full incorporationist' view of that
Amendment."). The Supreme Court's position on the matter is noticeably absent.
See e.g., Wendy Brown, Guns, Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism:
On Sanford Levinson's The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE LJ. 661, 662
(1989) ("The preambled Second Amendment is ambiguous about whether it grants
citizens the right to bear arms for protection of the state against the state, or against
one another." (footnotes omitted))); Levinson, supra, at 640 (writing that "'[t]he
Supreme Court has not determined, at least not with any clarity, whether the
amendment protects only a right of state governments against federal interference
with state militia.., or a right of individuals against the federal and state govern-
ment[s]'" (quotingJ. NOWAK ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 316 n.4 (3d ed. 1986))).
6 Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245, 260 (1934).
'
6 9 Id. (emphasis added).
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The Court has ruled otherwise, however, proclaiming that, with
regard to the militia, the state maintains the power to regulate the
possession of arms.
C. The Reasonable Relationship Test
1. Power to Regulate the Militia Grants State Governments
the Power to Determine When Possession of
Arms May Be Proscribed
A new controversy developed after the Second Amendment's
adoption. The fledgling amendment was ambiguous as to whether
"people" referred to every individual as a part of the people, or
whether it meant the "people" in a collective sense. This question
has dominated subsequent interpretation of the Militia Clause.
Some interpret the Second Amendment as conferring two distinct,
yet related rights: the right to a "well regulated militia" and the
right to "keep and bear arms." Others view this provision as a
single right: the right to bear arms constituting a necessary element
of the right to form a militia. 170
Even if the original intent of the Second Amendment was to
create two distinct rights, judicial interpretation of the Militia
Clause promptly established that the two clauses are integrally
related. I7 1 Perhaps this was the result of the judiciary reacting to
171 Compare Stuart R. Hays, The Right to Bear Arms, a Study in Judicial Misinterpreta-
tion, 2 WM. & MARY L. REv. 381, 396-406 (1960) (discussing the question of whether
the right to bear arms is an individual right and concluding that, without the
individual right to bear arms, the Militia Clause is devoid of all meaning) and William
Van Alstyne, The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DuKE LJ. 1236,
1243 (1994) (noting that "the Second Amendment adheres to the guarantee of the
right of the people to keep and bear arms as the predicate for the other provision to
which it speaks, i.e., the provision respecting a militia") with FREEDMAN, supra note 20,
at 20 (asserting that "[t]he 'right' was a collective or corporate right, not an individual
right, to insure that the balance between liberty and authority, within the newly
formed union, would be maintained") and MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 163 (arguing
that "[t]he clause concerning the militia was not intended to limit ownership of arms
to militia members, or return control of the militia to the states, but rather to express
the preference for a militia over a standing army"). As noted by one scholar, the
"Second Amendment has never been a 'marvel of clarity.'" Moncure, supra note 21,
at 9.
1 There is academic authority to support the proposition that the two rights are
indeed separate. This question, however, is one of the most contested issues in
constitutional law and is well beyond the scope of this Comment. It is enough to
state that the Supreme Court has followed the proposition that the right to bear arms
is conditioned upon the state's ability to regulate the militia.
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the changing character of the United States, 17 2 as well as to the
adoption of a political system which, it was anticipated, would
maintain a sufficient check on any abuse committed by the federal
government. 7 . The Supreme Court, itself, has never clarified the
debate over the Second Amendment.17 4 Not surprisingly, the
The Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms has consistently been
interpreted byjudicial bodies as referring to a collective, not an individual, right. See
e.g., United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1019 (8th Cir. 1992) (stating that "we
cannot conclude that the Second Amendment protects the individual possession of
military weapons"), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614 (1993); Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n
v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp. 198, 210 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (concluding
that the Second Amendment does not imply an individual right to establish private
armies and to bear arms).
For sample discussions of the various interpretations of the Second Amendment
right to bear arms, see CRAMER, supra note 153, at 9; KRUSCHKE, supra note 20, at 12
(asserting that "[tihose who embrace the collective view also assert that ... the
'people' referred to are.., to be considered those who were intended to serve in the
militias" while "[t]he proponents of the individual view, on the other hand, argue that
the Amendment does not create a state right but instead protects a preexisting
individual right"); Van Alstyne, supra note 170, at 1242-44 ("The very assumption of
the clause [well regulated militia], moreover, is that ordinary citizens ... may
themselves possess arms, for it is from these ordinary citizens who as citizens have a
right to keep and bear arms... that such well regulated militia as a state may provide
for, is itself to be drawn .... The Second Amendment adheres to the guarantee of
the right of the people to keep and bear arms as the predicate for the other provision
to which it speaks, i.e., the provision respecting a militia .... The militia to be well-
regulated is a militia to be drawn from just such people (i.e., people with a right to
keep and bear arms) rather than from some other source (i.e., from people without
rights to keep and bear arms).").
1 After the adoption of the Second Amendment, the role of militia declined in
the United States. See Hale, 978 F.2d at 1019. Perhaps this can be attributed to less
concern about the federal government assuming total control of the citizenry, as a
result of the growing distance between the experience of the colonies and the reality
of the new system of government in the United States.
'7 2 See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
" See Van Alstyne, supra note 170, at 1239-40 ("[T]he useful case law of the
Second Amendment ... is mostly just missing in action.... The main reason there
is such a vacuum of useful Second Amendment understanding... is the arrested
jurisprudence of the subject as such, a condition due substantially to the Supreme
Court's own inertia. .. ."); see also Cottrol & Diamond, supra note 26, at 999-1000
("The Second Amendment also continues to be an arena of jurisprudence from which
the nation's highest Court has largely been absent. The nation's highest tribunal has
seriously addressed the issue in only three cases, and the most recent of these, United
States v. Miller, is over fifty years old." (footnote omitted)). Scholarly debate over the
right to bear arms and how this right relates to the Militia Clause ensues:
Emphasis on the militia clause has been proffered as evidence that the right
to have arms was only a 'collective right' to defend the state, not an
individual right to defend oneself. Emphasis on the main clause with its
assertion of the inviolability of the people's right to have weapons has been
cited as proof of an individual right to have arms.
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schism between advocates of both the collective and the individual
interpretations remains, and understanding it is vital to compre-
hending why private militia believe they should be accorded Second
Amendment protection. Militia members adhere to the individual
interpretation, contending that their right to engage in weapons
training is derived from the Second Amendment, regardless of who
is vested with the power to maintain a militia. This position,
however, fails to survive constitutional scrutiny, as the prevailing
judicial standard linking the right to bear arms to the maintenance
of a militia renders void their claim to Second Amendment
protection.
175
The Supreme Court held that the state has the power to regulate
the possession of arms in United States v. Miller.17' This case is
MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 136. The Second Amendment has
derived an astonishing variety of meanings from its single sentence.
[Scholars] argue, for example, that the purpose was only to preserve the
states' powers over state militia; that the amendment merely protects the
right of members of a militia-National Guard of today-to be armed; and
that the language 'the right of the people to keep and bear arms' should not
be interpreted to grant to any individual a right to own a weapon.
Id. at 162.
" "Whether the 'right to bear arms' for militia purposes is 'individual' or
'collective' in nature is irrelevant where.., the individual's possession of arms is not
related to the preservation or efficiency of a militia." Hale, 978 F.2d at 1020; see also
United States v.Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (concluding that "courts
have consistently held that the Second Amendment only confers a collective right of
keeping and bearing arms which must bear a 'reasonable relationship to- the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia'" (quoting United States v. Miller,
307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939)) (emphasis added)); Stevens v. United States, 440 F.2d 144,
149 (6th Cir. 1971) (arguing that "the Second Amendment right 'to keep and bear
Arms' applies only to the right of the State to maintain a militia and not to the
individual's right to bear arms").
176 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
The Presser Court appeared to foreshadow the Court's future view that the right
to bear arms is not an individual right, but rather that it relates to the militia's larger
role within society. See Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (noting that "the
states cannot.., prohibit the people from keepingand bearingarms, so as to deprive
the United States of their rightful resource for maintaining the public security, and
disable the people from performing their duty to the general government"); see also
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 166 Mass. 171, 172-73 (1896) ("The right to keep and
bear arms for the common defence does not include the right to associate together
as a military organization, or to drill and parade with arms in cities and towns, unless
authorized to do so by law. This is a matter affecting the public security, quiet and
good order, and it is within the police power of the Legislature to regulate the
bearing of arms so as to forbid such unauthorized drills and parades" (citing Presser,
116 U.S. at 264-65)).
For an assertion that this holding contravened the Second Amendment, see
CRAMER, supra note 153, at 129 (arguing that "Presser... presents an example of how
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paramount because it establishes the prevailing standard linking the
right to bear arms with the right to organize as a militia. The Court
stated that "[i]n the absence of any evidence tending to show that
possession or use of a 'shotgun'. . . has some reasonable relationship
to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we
cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to
keep and bear" arms.
177
Under the reasonable relationship standard, members of private
militia can argue that they have a right to bear arms only if there is
a private right to maintain a militia. This is so because the lack of
power to maintain a militia necessarily means the lack of power to
determine whether military training is reasonably related to that
militia. However, it has already been determined, under Presser v.
Illinois, that the state governments, not private citizens, are endowed
with the power to establish and regulate the militia. 178 Thus, it is
clear that state governments have the power to determine whether
private militia's possession of arms is reasonably related to the state
militia, and may constitutionally ban such possession if private
militia's conduct is not reasonably related to the state militia. Thus,
if the state determines that it is necessary to regulate private militia,
it is logical to conclude that private militia are therefore engaging
in weapons training in contravention of constitutionally permissible
state restrictions on paramilitary activity.
While militia members will certainly argue that their possession
of arms is reasonably related to the preservation and efficiency of
a militia, this view does not correspond with judicial application of
the reasonable relationship standard.179 The Miller standard has
the U.S. Supreme Court narrowly upheld the right to keep and bear arms, apparently
as an individual right, based on a republican view of military obligation-while
upholding a law that violated the spirit of the Second Amendment").
I" Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added). "Certainly it is not within judicial
notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use
could contribute to the common defense." Id.
For contrasting opinions of the Miller case, compare STEPHEN P. HALBROOK,
THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 164-69
(Independent Inst. 1994) (1984) (arguing that "Miller stands for the proposition that
the people, in their capacity as individuals, could keep and bear any arms appropriate
to militia use") with Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 16, at 41 (asserting that "[t]he
Court's analysis directly contradicts the argument that the second amendment
guarantees a right to bear arms for individual self-defense, sport-shooting, or other
purposes unrelated to participation in state militias").178 See supra notes 164-69 (discussing Presser).
1 See e.g., United States v. Johnson, 497 F.2d 548, 550 (4th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (denying a Second Amendment claim based on the Miller standard); Cody v.
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been applied by courts addressing claims by members of paramili-
tary organizations that they have a constitutional right to organize
and to keep and bear arms, and these opinions exemplify the
constitutionality of statutes proscribing private militia.
In United States v. Oakes,'° the Tenth Circuit held that affiliation
with the "Posse Comitatus" (a private militia organization) did not
constitute membership in the state militia, and therefore, did not
afford one the right to bear arms."" The Oakes court stated that
application of "the amendment so as to guarantee appellant's right
to keep an unregistered firearm which has not been shown to have
any connection to the militia, merely because he is technically a
member of the Kansas militia, would be unjustifiable in terms of
either logic or policy.""8 2 Applying the reasonable relationship test,
the Oakes court held that, even though one is literally a member of
the militia by virtue of being a male citizen within the age limits,
this status does not confer any Second Amendment rights on an
individual.
18 3
The Eighth Circuit, elaborating on the reasonable relationship
test, argued that it is "not sufficient to prove that the weapon in
question [is] susceptible to military use."184 Thus, although militia
members possess weapons for the purpose of defending themselves,
this is not ample justification for extending Second Amendment
protection to them. Rather, states can determine the extent to
which weapons possession furthers the goal of a well regulated
militia." 5
United States, 460 F.2d 34, 37 (8th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1010 (1972).
1'o 564 F.2d 384 (10th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 926 (1978).
"I' See id. at 387.
1
82 Id.
" See id.; see also United States v. Hale, 978 F.2d 1016, 1020 (8th Cir. 1992)
(affirming the proposition that "technical" membership in a state militia is not
sufficient to satisfy the "reasonable relationship" test), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1614
(1993); United States v. Warin, 530 F.2d 103, 106 (6th Cir.) (stating that "there is
absolutely no evidence that a submachine gun in the hands of an individual 'sedentary
militia' member would have any, much less a 'reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia'" (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. at
178)), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 948 (1976).
184 Hale, 978 F.2d at 1020 (denying Second Amendment protection "[w]here such
a claimant presented no evidence either that he was a member of a military
organization or that his use of the weapon was 'in preparation for a military career'"
(quoting Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 310
U.S. 770 (1943))).
" See Cases, 131 F.2d at 921 (arguing that "[w]hatever rights in this respect the
people may have depend upon local legislation").
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2. Private Militia Are Not Well Regulated
The Miller Court proclaimed that the possession of arms must
bear a reasonable relation to the preservation of a well regulated
militia. Although the meaning of the term "well regulated," as it
relates to militia, has not beenjudicially interpreted, the Court's use
of this term further implies that militia are to be governed by state
government and not private, unorganized groups. Although
scholarly consensus on the meaning of "well regulated" also appears
to be absent,186 it is clear that private militia are not "well regu-
lated." The states alone are vested with the power over militia.
Similarly, the right to possess arms is not arbitrarily conferred and
must bear a reasonable relation to the militia.
Short of the rallying cry that the federal government is a
tyrannical conglomerate that needs to be defeated, little else links
together the disparate paramilitary organizations throughout the
country."8 Militia members from different groups do not con-
vene to discuss a common plan, and any form of central command
is clearly lacking.'88 In no manner can private militia be charac-
terized as well regulated. On the contrary, their manner of
organization is extremely clandestine and disjointed, and less akin
to established military groups acting in concert to defend individual
'86 See FREEDMAN, supra note 20, at 21 ("'Well-regulated,' the adjective modifying
'militia,' is the very antithesis of 'unorganized.'"). For different opinions, see
MALCOLM, supra note 21, at 164 (arguing that "[t]he reference to a 'well regulated'
militia was meant to encourage the federal government to keep the militia in good
order"); Ehrman & Henigan, supra note 16, at 41 (discussing Miller and concluding
that "the Court regarded the militia as a government directed and organized military
force, not as a term synonymous with the armed citizenry at large"); Dougherty, supra
note 20, at 978-79 (asserting that "an interpretation of 'well regulated' to mean
organized would be inconsistent with the militias existing in the colonies for two
centuries" and that "'well regulated' was eighteenth-century military jargon for
government-trained, not government-controlled or organized").
"' "Most of these contemporary militias are nothing more than social clubs of
perhaps a dozen individuals who swear to protect the constitution from enemies ....
There have been only halting efforts to organize militias on a statewide level. No
national organization exists." Adam Parfrey & Jim Redden, Patriot Games: Linda
Thompson, A Gun-Toting Broad from Indianapolis, Wants to Know "Are You Ready for the
Next American Revolution?", VILLAGE VOICE, Oct. 11, 1994, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Curnws File.
188 See Wallace, supra note 39, at ZI (reporting that "[c]itizen militias ... are
scattered widely and lack formal affiliation and a centralized method of communica-
tions"); David Fritze, Patriots Vow to Fight Off "One-World Government", ARIZONA
REPUBLIC, Feb. 5, 1995, available in LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File (noting that
paramilitary organizations "are not a cohesive force" and that "[d]espite their shared
audiences, [militia] leaders are far from being a unified clique").
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rights. 9 Militia members could potentially be characterized as
filling the role of unorganized militia, as provided for by federal
statute, 9 ' but they still fall short of meeting the "well regulated"
requirement. 9
Although there is no clear consensus on the meaning of the
Second Amendment, the Supreme Court's seminal decisions and
their progeny lead to the conclusion that the state has the power to
regulate the militia, and that private militia are not protected under
the Second Amendment. Furthermore, the right to bear arms,
being integrally related to the power to regulate the militia is within
the state's prerogative. Thus, whether these paramilitary groups
argue that they constitute "the militia" or argue that they have a
"right to bear arms," their activity is not protected by the Second
Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The rise of paramilitary organizations is perceived by many to
pose a threat to democratic society. 2 Ironically, the roots of
... See Wills, supra note 32, at 68 ("One of the modern militia leaders who testified
before Congress said ... that the militia movement is informal, spontaneous, and
without fixed leadership. No eighteenth-century defender of the militias would have
spoken that way. Sensitive to the charge that militias could be mobs, they always
stressed that they were talking of a proper militia, a good militia, a correct militia, one
well-trained, well-disciplined, well-regulated."). See generally FIELD MANUAL, supra
note 19, § 2.4 (discussing training methods, and the manner of organization, thereby
illustrating the secretive nature of these groups).
190 See 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1994); see also Sam Walker, "Militias"FormingAcross US
to Protest Gun Control Laws, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 17, 1994, at 1, 14 ("Federal
code allows for both 'organized' and 'unorganized' well-regulated militias, but...
[although] groups like these self-styled militias may be unorganized, they do not
qualify as well-regulated'and are therefore not entitled to constitutional protection.").
1 "Militia proponents say that since the National Guard has been federalized,
there is no 'well-regulated' state militia. That, they say, has created a sort of militia
vacuum they fill with their unregulated kind." Rogers Worthington, Private Militias
March to Beat of Deep Distrust, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 25, 1994, at Dl, D19; see also Wills,
supra note 32, at 69 (stating that today's "so-called militias.., are not 'well-regulated'
in the constitutional sense. The only militia recognized by the Second Amendment
is one 'regulated' by the militia clauses of the Constitution-one organized, armed,
and disciplined by the federal government").
19 AJune, 1995, Wall StreetJournal poll showed that 62% of those polled felt that
Congress should hold hearings on the activities of private militia groups. See Albert
R. Hunt, The Waco Hearings Are a Sop to the Gun Lobby, WALL ST.J., July 13, 1995, at
All.
Militia groups recognize that they are perceived as a potential element of
instability in society. "Unless people know we are guided and motivated by lofty
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militia originate in the desire to defend society from a tyrannical
government. What was once conceived of as a necessary form of
protection has been transformed into a perceived element of
societal instability. This perception of paramilitary organizations,
however, does not properly inform an analysis of whether state
statutes can proscribe paramilitary organization and training. Such
analysis must rely upon constitutional interpretation.
Anti-paramilitary organization statutes violate the First Amend-
ment rights to freedom of speech and association. Anti-paramilitary
training statutes, on the other hand, do not violate the First
Amendment because they intend to protect public safety, not
suppress militia expression. In addition, such training cannot be
protected by the Second Amendment right to a well regulated
militia: the state has not conferred this distinction on paramilitary
groups, and their possession of arms is, therefore, not reasonably
related to the maintenance of a well regulated militia.
A court once speculated that "the proliferation of military/
paramilitary organizations can only serve to sow the seeds of future
domestic violence and tragedy."193 This prediction appears to
comport with the view of private militia as they are perceived by
others. As of yet, however, there is no evidence that the United
States government is faced with a realistic threat to its
existence.19 4 The courts will face a difficult determination if they
constitutional principles we might be misunderstood as fanatics, vigilantes, or even
criminals." FIELD MANUAL, supra note 19, § 2.4.1: Enemy Capabilities and Countermea-
sures;see also Tanner, supra note 36, at 43 (arguing that militia "motivations, members,
attitudes, and tactics have been grossly mischaracterized by culturally ignorant
reporters more concerned with telling sensational stories than with explaining the
more-complicated truth").
113 Vietnamese Fishermen's Ass'n v. Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, 543 F. Supp.
198, 219 (S.D. Tex. 1982). "'The inherent potential danger of any organized private
militia... is obvious. Its existence would be sufficient, without more, to prevent a
democratic form of government.., from functioning freely, without coercion, and
in accordance with the constitutional mandates.'" Id. at 209 (quoting In re Cassidy,
51 N.Y.S.2d 202, 205 (App. Div. 1944), aff'd, 73 N.E.2d 41 (N.Y. 1947)).
194 See Charles Laurence, Militiamen Go to War on American Gun Laws, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 21, 1994, available in LEXIS, Int-News database ("So far,
Washington has said nothing on the new militias. They are not known to be doing
anything illegal: merely exercising their right to free assembly and to practice firing
their weapons."); Walker, supra note 190, at 14 (reporting that a Department of
Justice spokesman stated that "unless these groups are known to be modifying
weapons or plotting violent action, federal law-enforcement officials are not
concerned with them"); see also Fritze, supra note 188, at Al (asserting that "[e]xactly
where the militia phenomenon is heading is unclear"); Worthington, supra note 191,
at D19 (writing that "there are questions about the constitutionality of the militias and
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are forced to decide when this adversarial element crosses the
delicate boundary between being a healthy opponent to a destruc-
tive enemy. In doing so, the courts themselves will walk a fine line-
drawing a distinction between the preservation of public safety and
the preservation of coveted constitutional rights.
about whether, if push came to shove, they would use their weapons for anything
other than making symbolic statements").
